extant2000/flamenet-relay
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues 14 Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

The comparison page, in words people use (relay#12) #136

Merged
paulhitt merged 1 commits from docs/comparison-in-plain-words into main 2026-09-07 11:47:42 +00:00
Conversation 3 Commits 1 Files Changed 1
+41 -17
1 changed files with 41 additions and 17 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
Resources/Views/comparison.leaf
+41 -17
View File
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<th scope="row">Encrypted end to end by default</th>
<th scope="row">Nobody in between can read it</th>
<td class="mine"><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>Every conversation. There is no plain mode to switch to &mdash; the server has no route that accepts a readable message.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong><br><small>Only in Secret Chats, which are one-to-one and have to be started deliberately.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>Between Apple devices, and with Android over RCS since iOS 26.5.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>Between Apple devices, and with Android since iOS 26.5 &mdash; but only for the newer kind of text message, not the old kind.</small></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th scope="row">Works without a phone number</th>
@@ -48,58 +48,58 @@
<tr>
<th scope="row">Message someone on a different server</th>
<td class="mine"><strong class="part">Android now</strong><br><small>Like email: your friend doesn&rsquo;t have to be on the same server as you, and each server picks who it will exchange messages with. Out now on Android, on iPhone once Apple approves &mdash; and you both need it, since it takes two sides to cross.</small></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong><br><small>Deliberately. Federating spreads metadata across operators, which Signal declines to do.</small></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong><br><small>Deliberately. Letting servers talk to each other means more companies learn who is talking to whom, which Signal has chosen not to do.</small></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th scope="row">Your identity survives your server</th>
<th scope="row">You keep your name if you move servers</th>
<td class="mine"><strong class="part">Android now</strong><br><small>Your address comes from your passphrase, not from a number a server handed you. Sign in somewhere else with the same passphrase and you are still the same person to everyone who knows you. Out now on Android, on iPhone once Apple approves.</small></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong><br><small>Your account lives on Signal's servers.</small></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th scope="row">Mail can wait at more than one server</th>
<th scope="row">Messages can wait for you in more than one place</th>
<td class="mine"><strong class="part">Android now</strong><br><small>Keep a mailbox on two servers, and losing one costs you neither your messages nor your address. Add the second <em>before</em> you need it. Out now on Android, on iPhone once Apple approves.</small></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th scope="row">Source code published</th>
<td class="mine"><strong class="yes">Apps and server</strong><br><small>All of it, under the MIT licence: both apps, the server, and the protocol engine they share. Four repositories, nothing held back.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Apps and server</strong><br><small>Under the AGPL and GPL.</small></td>
<th scope="row">Anyone can read the code</th>
<td class="mine"><strong class="yes">Apps and server</strong><br><small>All of it, under the MIT licence: both apps, the server, and the shared code that does the encrypting. Four repositories, nothing held back.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Apps and server</strong><br><small>Under licences that require anyone who changes it and runs it for others to publish their changes.</small></td>
<td><strong class="part">Apps only</strong><br><small>The server side is closed.</small></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th scope="row">Post-quantum key agreement</th>
<th scope="row">Safe from the computers that are coming &mdash; when a conversation starts</th>
<td class="mine"><strong class="part">Android now</strong><br><small>Stops someone recording your messages today and reading them years from now, once the computers to do it exist. Out now on Android, on iPhone once Apple approves &mdash; and it counts only once you both have it.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>Using PQXDH.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>Yes, at the start of a conversation.</small></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>Using PQ3.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>Yes. Apple has done this longest.</small></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th scope="row">Post-quantum in the ongoing ratchet</th>
<th scope="row">&mdash; and every message after that</th>
<td class="mine"><strong class="part">Android now</strong><br><small>The row above protects the start of a conversation; this carries the same protection through every message, with fresh maths each time rather than once at the beginning. Out now on Android, on iPhone once Apple approves &mdash; and like everything here it counts only once you both have it, so today that means two Android phones.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>Signal&rsquo;s Sparse Post-Quantum Ratchet, shipped in October 2025 and rolling out gradually. It runs alongside their Double Ratchet rather than replacing it.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>Signal added this in October 2025 and is rolling it out gradually. It works alongside what they already had rather than replacing it.</small></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>Using PQ3.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>Yes. Apple has done this longest.</small></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th scope="row">Keys verified automatically, not just by hand</th>
<th scope="row">Your app checks your contact is really them</th>
<td class="mine"><strong class="part">Android now</strong><br><small>Your app checks, by itself and with nothing to switch on, that your contact&rsquo;s key really is theirs. A server that goes quiet about a key it already vouched for is treated as caught rather than as having a bad day. Out now on Android, on iPhone once Apple approves.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong></td>
<td><strong class="no">No</strong></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>Contact Key Verification, opt-in.</small></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th scope="row">Independent security audit</th>
<th scope="row">Checked by outsiders</th>
<td class="mine"><strong class="part">Planned</strong><br><small>The scope for one is written and public, and donations pay for it. Until then the code is open and heavily tested.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong></td>
<td><strong class="part">Partly</strong><br><small>Its protocol has been examined externally, with mixed findings.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>PQ3 was formally analysed by outside academics.</small></td>
<td><strong class="yes">Yes</strong><br><small>Apple&rsquo;s design was examined by academics outside the company.</small></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th scope="row">You can install it today</th>
@@ -188,6 +188,30 @@
and iMessage are trademarks of Apple Inc. This project is not affiliated
with, endorsed by, or connected to any of them.
</p>
<h2 id="the-real-names">The real names, if you want to go and check</h2>
<p>Nothing in the table above uses these, on purpose: a heading you have to
look up first has asked you to do our work. They are here because a reader who
wants to verify a row needs the actual term to search for, and leaving them out
entirely would be its own kind of unhelpful.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Safe from the computers that are coming</strong> &mdash; the field
calls this <em>post-quantum</em> cryptography. At the start of a conversation
Signal calls theirs <em>PQXDH</em>, Apple&rsquo;s is part of <em>PQ3</em>, and
ours is a hybrid of X25519 and <em>ML-KEM-768</em>.</li>
<li><strong>And every message after that</strong> &mdash; the repeating part of
a conversation&rsquo;s encryption is called a <em>ratchet</em>. Signal&rsquo;s
post-quantum one is the <em>Sparse Post-Quantum Ratchet</em>, announced October
2025; ours is protocol <em>v3</em>.</li>
<li><strong>Your app checks your contact is really them</strong> &mdash;
<em>key transparency</em>, built on an append-only <em>Merkle</em> log.</li>
<li><strong>Anyone can read the code</strong> &mdash; ours is <em>MIT</em>;
Signal&rsquo;s apps and server are <em>AGPL</em> and <em>GPL</em>.</li>
<li><strong>Message someone on a different server</strong> &mdash;
<em>federation</em>.</li>
<li><strong>Between Apple devices, and with Android</strong> &mdash; the newer
kind of text message is <em>RCS</em>; the old kind is SMS.</li>
</ul>
</div>
</article>
#endexport