diff --git a/Resources/Views/comparison.leaf b/Resources/Views/comparison.leaf index 1cc4467..4db252e 100644 --- a/Resources/Views/comparison.leaf +++ b/Resources/Views/comparison.leaf @@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ - Encrypted end to end by default + Nobody in between can read it Yes
Every conversation. There is no plain mode to switch to — the server has no route that accepts a readable message. Yes No
Only in Secret Chats, which are one-to-one and have to be started deliberately. - Yes
Between Apple devices, and with Android over RCS since iOS 26.5. + Yes
Between Apple devices, and with Android since iOS 26.5 — but only for the newer kind of text message, not the old kind. Works without a phone number @@ -48,58 +48,58 @@ Message someone on a different server Android now
Like email: your friend doesn’t have to be on the same server as you, and each server picks who it will exchange messages with. Out now on Android, on iPhone once Apple approves — and you both need it, since it takes two sides to cross. - No
Deliberately. Federating spreads metadata across operators, which Signal declines to do. + No
Deliberately. Letting servers talk to each other means more companies learn who is talking to whom, which Signal has chosen not to do. No No - Your identity survives your server + You keep your name if you move servers Android now
Your address comes from your passphrase, not from a number a server handed you. Sign in somewhere else with the same passphrase and you are still the same person to everyone who knows you. Out now on Android, on iPhone once Apple approves. No
Your account lives on Signal's servers. No No - Mail can wait at more than one server + Messages can wait for you in more than one place Android now
Keep a mailbox on two servers, and losing one costs you neither your messages nor your address. Add the second before you need it. Out now on Android, on iPhone once Apple approves. No No No - Source code published - Apps and server
All of it, under the MIT licence: both apps, the server, and the protocol engine they share. Four repositories, nothing held back. - Apps and server
Under the AGPL and GPL. + Anyone can read the code + Apps and server
All of it, under the MIT licence: both apps, the server, and the shared code that does the encrypting. Four repositories, nothing held back. + Apps and server
Under licences that require anyone who changes it and runs it for others to publish their changes. Apps only
The server side is closed. No - Post-quantum key agreement + Safe from the computers that are coming — when a conversation starts Android now
Stops someone recording your messages today and reading them years from now, once the computers to do it exist. Out now on Android, on iPhone once Apple approves — and it counts only once you both have it. - Yes
Using PQXDH. + Yes
Yes, at the start of a conversation. No - Yes
Using PQ3. + Yes
Yes. Apple has done this longest. - Post-quantum in the ongoing ratchet + — and every message after that Android now
The row above protects the start of a conversation; this carries the same protection through every message, with fresh maths each time rather than once at the beginning. Out now on Android, on iPhone once Apple approves — and like everything here it counts only once you both have it, so today that means two Android phones. - Yes
Signal’s Sparse Post-Quantum Ratchet, shipped in October 2025 and rolling out gradually. It runs alongside their Double Ratchet rather than replacing it. + Yes
Signal added this in October 2025 and is rolling it out gradually. It works alongside what they already had rather than replacing it. No - Yes
Using PQ3. + Yes
Yes. Apple has done this longest. - Keys verified automatically, not just by hand + Your app checks your contact is really them Android now
Your app checks, by itself and with nothing to switch on, that your contact’s key really is theirs. A server that goes quiet about a key it already vouched for is treated as caught rather than as having a bad day. Out now on Android, on iPhone once Apple approves. Yes No Yes
Contact Key Verification, opt-in. - Independent security audit + Checked by outsiders Planned
The scope for one is written and public, and donations pay for it. Until then the code is open and heavily tested. Yes Partly
Its protocol has been examined externally, with mixed findings. - Yes
PQ3 was formally analysed by outside academics. + Yes
Apple’s design was examined by academics outside the company. You can install it today @@ -188,6 +188,30 @@ and iMessage are trademarks of Apple Inc. This project is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or connected to any of them.

+

The real names, if you want to go and check

+

Nothing in the table above uses these, on purpose: a heading you have to +look up first has asked you to do our work. They are here because a reader who +wants to verify a row needs the actual term to search for, and leaving them out +entirely would be its own kind of unhelpful.

+ + #endexport