Paul HittandClaude Opus 5 ef1a8138aa Remote erase on Android (§6.26)
Android had no part of this: no type, no route, no fetch. The relay's
half was complete and iOS had the crypto, so a lost Android phone was
the one that could not be erased at all.

DeviceWipe in the engine, signing and verifying the same canonical
string as the iOS half, `fnwipe:v1:<device>:<seconds>`. A vector in
the tests takes a signature the SWIFT implementation produced and
verifies it here, and the iOS suite takes one produced here. Not a
comparison of the two signatures: CryptoKit randomises Ed25519 signing
and this does not, so they never match and never need to. What interop
needs is that each side verifies what the other signed.

The poll asks once a session and stops there if it erased, rather than
carrying on into a vault it has just emptied. The account public key it
checks against comes out of the address this device already stored, not
out of anything the relay just said.

Issuing is on the Devices card and asks for the passphrase, which is
what somebody holding the phone does not have. A passphrase that does
not derive this account's published address is refused before anything
reaches the relay. The dialog shows DeviceWipe.HONEST_DESCRIPTION,
kept word for word with the iOS copy: two apps describing one guarantee
differently is how somebody ends up believing the stronger sentence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-20 16:56:01 -04:00
2026-09-20 16:56:01 -04:00
2026-09-20 16:56:01 -04:00
2026-09-20 16:56:01 -04:00
2026-08-21 18:22:30 -04:00
2026-08-21 18:22:30 -04:00
2026-08-21 18:22:30 -04:00
2026-08-21 18:22:30 -04:00
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2026-09-18 13:42:39 -04:00
2026-09-09 09:30:32 -04:00

Flamenet Messenger. Android

The Android app, and the two libraries under it. The product's site is at https://flamenetmessenger.com.

engine/   the protocol: X3DH, Double Ratchet, sealed sender, safety numbers,
          key transparency. Plain Kotlin/JVM, no Android in it at all.
client/   the relay transport: HTTP, auth, the §8 routes.
app/      the Compose app.
interop/  the cross-engine driver; not shipped.

engine and client are deliberately plain JVM libraries. The protocol has nothing to do with Android, and keeping it off the platform means their tests run anywhere a JVM does, no SDK, no emulator, no device, which is also what lets them gate in CI on Linux:

./gradlew :engine:test :client:test

The app's own unit tests need the Android SDK but still no emulator (Robolectric):

./gradlew :app:testDebugUnitTest

Where it stands

PARITY.md is the definition of done for this app, read that, not this. Every row there names the iOS file it came from so it can be re-checked rather than trusted. Headlines: messaging, groups, attachments, voice notes, stories, calls, sealed sender, key transparency and the encrypted vault are built and tested, and a cross-platform round trip against iOS is verified.

If a claim here ever disagrees with PARITY.md or with the tree, believe those, and fix this.

Why the engine came first, and is held to the vectors

An Android client needs the protocol implemented a third time, and the third implementation is the one that finds the places where the specification says less than the two existing engines quietly agreed on, but only if it is written against the spec and the published vectors rather than against a reading of our own Swift and JavaScript. So the engine is held to test/vectors/protocol-v1.json in flamenet-e2e, the same file the other two engines are checked against, read from that repository rather than copied here, because a copied vector file drifts and a drifting vector file stops being a check. PublishedVectorsTest looks for it beside this checkout and fails loudly if it cannot find it; FLAMENET_VECTORS overrides the search.

Two implementations that agree may both be wrong in the same way, especially when one was written while reading the other. The audit-path ordering in §19 is the worked example: a top-down reading of a bottom-up path produces the correct root for every left-spine index, so it passes any test that only checks index 0. The vector file pins a right-descending index for that reason, and the Kotlin tests assert both that the published path verifies and that the same path reversed does not.

If this engine ever disagrees with the file, the interesting question is which of the three is wrong, not this one by default.

Contributing and security

  • CONTRIBUTING.md, building (JDK 21, JAVA_HOME is not optional on a Mac), the test gate, and the platform traps that cost an hour each.
  • PARITY.md, what iOS does, what this does, and what is left. It is the definition of done for this app.
  • SECURITY.md, threat model and where to send a vulnerability report. Not an issue tracker matter: security@flamenetmessenger.com.
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Flamenet Messenger for Android — the Kotlin engine, held to the published protocol vectors. No app yet. MIT.
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