Sessions are signed with a shared HMAC secret. That is fine while every verifier
is a service we run, and it permanently excludes everyone else: HMAC cannot
separate verifying from minting, so a relay given the secret in order to CHECK a
FlameNet session could equally FORGE one for any account here. There is no
configuration of a shared secret that makes it safe to hand out — which is why
somebody else's relay has never been able to accept FlameNet identities.
Ed25519 separates the two. The private half stays in this service; the public
half is published at /.well-known/jwks.json in the standard shape, so a relay
operator points ordinary JWT tooling at it rather than writing something bespoke
against a format only this project uses. Anyone can verify. Nobody else can
sign.
Both algorithms are registered during the changeover, and signing only moves to
EdDSA once a key is configured. Existing verifiers hold the shared secret and
nothing else, so they would reject every token the moment this service started
signing with a key they have never seen. Retiring HMAC is a separate step that
has to follow the verifiers, not lead them.
Additive: with ENCLAVE_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY unset nothing changes, and the service
logs why third-party relays cannot be added in that state rather than leaving it
to be discovered.
kid is present from the first key even though there is only one. Without it a
second key later forces every verifier to try each key against every token, and
a rotation becomes indistinguishable from a forgery attempt in the logs.
Existing suites pass unchanged (52 tests). What this does NOT do: the relay
still verifies with the shared secret, so nothing can use this yet — that side
is the next change, and until it lands this is capability without a consumer.
Sessions are signed with a shared HMAC secret. That is fine while every verifier
is a service we run, and it permanently excludes everyone else: HMAC cannot
separate verifying from minting, so a relay given the secret in order to CHECK a
FlameNet session could equally FORGE one for any account here. There is no
configuration of a shared secret that makes it safe to hand out — which is why
somebody else's relay has never been able to accept FlameNet identities.
Ed25519 separates the two. The private half stays in this service; the public
half is published at `/.well-known/jwks.json` in the standard shape, so a relay
operator points ordinary JWT tooling at it rather than writing something bespoke
against a format only this project uses. Anyone can verify. Nobody else can
sign.
Both algorithms are registered during the changeover, and signing only moves to
EdDSA once a key is configured. Existing verifiers hold the shared secret and
nothing else, so they would reject every token the moment this service started
signing with a key they have never seen. Retiring HMAC is a separate step that
has to follow the verifiers, not lead them.
Additive: with ENCLAVE_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY unset nothing changes, and the service
logs why third-party relays cannot be added in that state rather than leaving it
to be discovered.
`kid` is present from the first key even though there is only one. Without it a
second key later forces every verifier to try each key against every token, and
a rotation becomes indistinguishable from a forgery attempt in the logs.
Existing suites pass unchanged (52 tests). What this does NOT do: the relay
still verifies with the shared secret, so nothing can use this yet — that side
is the next change, and until it lands this is capability without a consumer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
added 1 commit
<ul><li>b89d5ac8 - Actually sign with the key that was registered</li></ul>
[Compare with previous version](/paulhitt/flamenet-files/-/merge_requests/1/diffs?diff_id=1978306753&start_sha=a905f0286f54fd882107233a74eb41eece65f185)
added 26 commits
<ul><li>b89d5ac8...3c635735 - 23 commits from branch <code>main</code></li><li>a8271cfa - Sign sessions with a key that verifiers cannot forge</li><li>09d14b13 - Actually sign with the key that was registered</li><li>b64c4640 - Test the encoding the published key is written in</li></ul>
[Compare with previous version](/paulhitt/flamenet-files/-/merge_requests/1/diffs?diff_id=2007872030&start_sha=b89d5ac82bbe626d98829f960a6ff2c40f5ef186)
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Sessions are signed with a shared HMAC secret. That is fine while every verifier
is a service we run, and it permanently excludes everyone else: HMAC cannot
separate verifying from minting, so a relay given the secret in order to CHECK a
FlameNet session could equally FORGE one for any account here. There is no
configuration of a shared secret that makes it safe to hand out — which is why
somebody else's relay has never been able to accept FlameNet identities.
Ed25519 separates the two. The private half stays in this service; the public
half is published at
/.well-known/jwks.jsonin the standard shape, so a relayoperator points ordinary JWT tooling at it rather than writing something bespoke
against a format only this project uses. Anyone can verify. Nobody else can
sign.
Both algorithms are registered during the changeover, and signing only moves to
EdDSA once a key is configured. Existing verifiers hold the shared secret and
nothing else, so they would reject every token the moment this service started
signing with a key they have never seen. Retiring HMAC is a separate step that
has to follow the verifiers, not lead them.
Additive: with ENCLAVE_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY unset nothing changes, and the service
logs why third-party relays cannot be added in that state rather than leaving it
to be discovered.
kidis present from the first key even though there is only one. Without it asecond key later forces every verifier to try each key against every token, and
a rotation becomes indistinguishable from a forgery attempt in the logs.
Existing suites pass unchanged (52 tests). What this does NOT do: the relay
still verifies with the shared secret, so nothing can use this yet — that side
is the next change, and until it lands this is capability without a consumer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 noreply@anthropic.com
assigned to @paulhitt
added 1 commit
Compare with previous version
mentioned in commit
a95a64cde9mentioned in merge request !8
added 26 commits
maina8271cfa- Sign sessions with a key that verifiers cannot forge09d14b13- Actually sign with the key that was registeredb64c4640- Test the encoding the published key is written inCompare with previous version
mentioned in commit
c6e75e0c01