First public release

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.editorconfig

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+root = true
+
+[*]
+charset = utf-8
+end_of_line = lf
+insert_final_newline = true
+trim_trailing_whitespace = true
+indent_style = space
+indent_size = 2
+
+[*.md]
+trim_trailing_whitespace = false

.gitignore

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+node_modules/
+dist/
+*.log
+.DS_Store
+.env*
+!.env.example
+.npmrc
+dist-cjs/

.gitlab-ci.yml

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+stages: [test]
+
+test:
+  stage: test
+  image: node:22-alpine
+  script: [npm ci, npm run build, npm test]

CHANGELOG.md

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+# Changelog
+
+## 0.2.0 - 2026-09-28
+
+First public release under MIT.
+
+- `scan()` finds compose services that publish host ports and so bypass the
+  reverse proxy. Sensitive ports are critical, other ports high, loopback
+  bindings informational.
+- The proxy publishing 80 and 443 is not flagged. A proxy label does not
+  excuse a published port.
+- `toReport()` and `formatScan()` produce and render a report in the
+  `@extant2000/evidence-record` format, citing file, line and binding.
+- An empty scan is reported as not assessed, never as clean.

CONTRIBUTING.md

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+# Contributing
+
+Issues and merge requests are welcome at
+https://gitlab.com/extant2000/side-door.
+
+## Ground rules
+
+- **A test that cannot fail proves nothing.** If you fix a bug, add a test
+  that fails without your fix, and check that it does fail before you submit.
+- Measure, do not assume. Two modules with the same line count can be
+  different programs.
+- Keep dependencies minimal. Every new dependency needs a reason.
+- Explain why in comments, not what.
+
+## Before you open a merge request
+
+Run both of these and make sure they pass:
+
+```
+npm run build
+npm test
+```

LICENSE

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+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 Extant 2000 LLC
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

README.md

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+# SideDoor
+
+Finds services in Docker Compose files that are reachable without going
+through your reverse proxy.
+
+## What it does and why
+
+Policy enforced at a reverse proxy (geo-blocking, authentication, rate
+limits, TLS) applies only to traffic that passes through the proxy. A
+container that publishes a host port sidesteps all of it. Nothing in the
+proxy's own configuration can tell you this happened, because the proxy does
+not know the door exists. You can read the whole proxy config and never learn
+that a sibling container opened port 2222 on the host.
+
+**So SideDoor looks at published host ports, not at the proxy config.** You
+pass it parsed compose services, and it reports every binding that opens a
+path around the proxy:
+
+| Binding | Result |
+|---|---|
+| A sensitive port published on the host (SSH, telnet, PostgreSQL, MySQL, Redis, MongoDB, Elasticsearch, AMQP, memcached, the Docker API) | Fail, critical |
+| Any other published host port | Fail, high |
+| A port bound to loopback (`127.0.0.1`, `localhost`, `::1`) | Not applicable, still printed: not reachable from the internet, but any process on the host reaches it without the proxy |
+| The proxy itself publishing 80 or 443 | Ignored. That is the edge doing its job. |
+| No published ports | Counted as internal, the safe shape |
+
+A `traefik.enable=true` label marks a service as proxied, but it does not
+excuse a published port next to it. Being routable through the proxy says
+nothing about the door beside it. The proxy service names (`traefik`,
+`proxy`, `caddy`, `nginx-proxy`) and edge ports (80, 443) can be changed with
+`edgeServices` and `edgePorts`.
+
+Findings are sorted worst first, so a critical never hides under a page of
+info lines. An empty scan is reported as not assessed, never as clean. When
+there is nothing to report, the output says "No unproxied public bindings
+found" instead of leaving a blank, because a gap of this kind is invisible
+and a clean result has to be stated.
+
+The library is pure: no Docker, no network and no filesystem. You parse the
+compose files; it judges them. Reports use the `@extant2000/evidence-record`
+format, and every finding cites the compose file, the line when your parser
+tracked one, and the exact port mapping.
+
+## Usage
+
+```ts
+import { scan, toReport, formatScan } from '@extant2000/side-door'
+
+const result = scan([
+  { name: 'traefik', file: 'compose.yml', line: 3, ports: ['80:80', '443:443'] },
+  { name: 'app', file: 'compose.yml', line: 12, labels: ['traefik.enable=true'] },
+  { name: 'db', file: 'compose.yml', line: 20, ports: ['5432:5432'] },
+  { name: 'cache', file: 'compose.yml', line: 28, ports: ['127.0.0.1:6379:6379'] },
+  { name: 'worker', file: 'compose.yml', line: 34 },
+])
+
+const report = toReport(result)   // evidence-record report
+console.log(formatScan(result))
+```
+
+The finding lines from that output:
+
+```
+✗ CRITICAL db publishes 5432:5432   [NOT MET]
+◦ info     cache publishes 127.0.0.1:6379:6379   [N/A]
+```
+
+`parseBinding()` is exported too. It handles `80`, `8080:80`,
+`127.0.0.1:8080:80` and `8080:80/tcp`, and returns `null` for anything it
+cannot parse. A bare `80` still publishes a host port.
+
+## Install
+
+```
+npm install @extant2000/side-door
+```
+
+## License
+
+MIT. See [LICENSE](LICENSE).

SECURITY.md

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+# Security
+
+Please report vulnerabilities privately by email to security@extant2000.com.
+Do not open a public issue for a security problem.
+
+We aim to acknowledge every report within 5 business days.

package.json

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+{
+  "name": "@extant2000/side-door",
+  "version": "0.2.0",
+  "private": false,
+  "description": "Finds services that can be reached without going through your reverse proxy.",
+  "license": "MIT",
+  "type": "module",
+  "main": "dist/index.js",
+  "files": [
+    "dist",
+    "src",
+    "README.md",
+    "LICENSE"
+  ],
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "https://gitlab.com/extant2000/side-door.git"
+  },
+  "types": "dist/index.d.ts",
+  "exports": {
+    ".": {
+      "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/index.js"
+    }
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsc",
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "prepublishOnly": "npm run build"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "typescript": "^5.6.0",
+    "vitest": "^2.1.0"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@extant2000/evidence-record": "^0.1.1"
+  },
+  "author": "Extant 2000 LLC",
+  "homepage": "https://gitlab.com/extant2000/side-door",
+  "bugs": {
+    "url": "https://gitlab.com/extant2000/side-door/-/issues"
+  }
+}

src/index.ts

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+/**
+ * SideDoor — find the services bypassing your proxy or mesh entirely.
+ *
+ * The problem: policy enforced at the reverse proxy (geo-gating,
+ * auth, rate limits, TLS) applies only to traffic that GOES THROUGH the proxy.
+ * A container publishing a host port sidesteps every one of those controls, and
+ * nothing in the proxy's own config can tell you it happened — the proxy has no
+ * idea the door exists.
+ *
+ * Pure: takes parsed compose services, returns findings. No Docker, no network,
+ * no filesystem, so it is testable and safe to run anywhere.
+ */
+
+import {
+  type CapabilityReport,
+  type Finding as EvidenceFinding,
+  type Severity,
+  evidence,
+  formatReport,
+} from '@extant2000/evidence-record'
+
+export interface ComposeService {
+  /** Service name as written in the compose file. */
+  name: string
+  /** Compose file this came from. */
+  file: string
+  /**
+   * 1-indexed line where this service is declared, when the caller's parser
+   * tracks it. Carried through to the citation so a finding opens in an
+   * editor rather than sending the reader hunting through the file.
+   */
+  line?: number
+  /**
+   * Published host ports, e.g. "8080:80", "127.0.0.1:5432:5432", "2222:22".
+   * Only PUBLISHED ports matter — `expose` keeps a port on the container
+   * network, which is exactly the safe case.
+   */
+  ports?: string[]
+  /** Raw label strings, e.g. "traefik.enable=true". */
+  labels?: string[]
+  /** `network_mode: service:gluetun` and similar. */
+  networkMode?: string
+}
+
+export type Exposure = 'public' | 'loopback' | 'proxied' | 'internal'
+
+export interface Finding {
+  service: string
+  file: string
+  /** Line in `file` where the service is declared, when known. */
+  line?: number
+  /** The published port mapping that created the exposure. */
+  binding: string
+  hostPort: number
+  exposure: Exposure
+  /** Why this matters, in one line. */
+  reason: string
+  severity: 'critical' | 'high' | 'info'
+}
+
+export interface ScanReport {
+  findings: Finding[]
+  /** Services that route through the proxy as intended. */
+  proxied: string[]
+  /** Services with no published ports at all — the safe shape. */
+  internal: string[]
+  scanned: number
+  /**
+   * True when nothing was scanned. Never reported as "clean".
+   *
+   * @deprecated Read `overall(toReport(scan))` instead — it distinguishes
+   * "nothing was scanned" from "nothing applied" from a real pass, which a
+   * single boolean cannot. Kept because it is still accurate.
+   */
+  vacuous: boolean
+}
+
+/** Ports whose exposure is nearly always a mistake outside a bastion. */
+const SENSITIVE: Record<number, string> = {
+  22: 'SSH', 23: 'telnet', 3306: 'MySQL/MariaDB', 5432: 'PostgreSQL',
+  6379: 'Redis', 27017: 'MongoDB', 9200: 'Elasticsearch', 5672: 'AMQP',
+  11211: 'memcached', 2375: 'Docker API (unauthenticated)', 2376: 'Docker API',
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse a compose port mapping.
+ *
+ * Forms: "80", "8080:80", "127.0.0.1:8080:80", "8080:80/tcp".
+ * A leading host IP of 127.0.0.1/localhost binds loopback only — reachable
+ * from the box but not the internet, which is a materially different risk.
+ */
+export function parseBinding(binding: string): { hostIp?: string, hostPort: number, containerPort: number } | null {
+  const clean = binding.split('/')[0]!.trim()
+  const parts = clean.split(':')
+  if (parts.length === 1) {
+    const p = Number(parts[0])
+    // A bare "80" publishes an EPHEMERAL host port — still published.
+    return Number.isFinite(p) ? { hostPort: p, containerPort: p } : null
+  }
+  if (parts.length === 2) {
+    const h = Number(parts[0]); const c = Number(parts[1])
+    return Number.isFinite(h) && Number.isFinite(c) ? { hostPort: h, containerPort: c } : null
+  }
+  if (parts.length >= 3) {
+    const ip = parts[0]
+    const h = Number(parts[parts.length - 2]); const c = Number(parts[parts.length - 1])
+    return Number.isFinite(h) && Number.isFinite(c) ? { hostIp: ip, hostPort: h, containerPort: c } : null
+  }
+  return null
+}
+
+function isLoopback(ip?: string): boolean {
+  return ip === '127.0.0.1' || ip === 'localhost' || ip === '::1'
+}
+
+function proxyEnabled(labels?: string[]): boolean {
+  return (labels ?? []).some(l => /traefik\.enable\s*=\s*true/i.test(l))
+}
+
+export interface ScanOptions {
+  /**
+   * Ports the proxy itself legitimately owns (80/443 by default). A service
+   * publishing these IS the edge, not a bypass of it.
+   */
+  edgePorts?: number[]
+  /** Service names known to be the proxy. */
+  edgeServices?: string[]
+}
+
+/**
+ * Find services reachable without traversing the proxy.
+ *
+ * The check is deliberately about PUBLISHED HOST PORTS rather than about the
+ * proxy's config, because that is the asymmetry that makes this class of gap
+ * invisible: you can read the entire Traefik configuration and never learn that
+ * a sibling container opened port 2222 on the host.
+ */
+export function scan(services: ComposeService[], opts: ScanOptions = {}): ScanReport {
+  const edgePorts = new Set(opts.edgePorts ?? [80, 443])
+  const edgeServices = new Set(opts.edgeServices ?? ['traefik', 'proxy', 'caddy', 'nginx-proxy'])
+
+  const findings: Finding[] = []
+  const proxied: string[] = []
+  const internal: string[] = []
+
+  for (const svc of services) {
+    const published = svc.ports ?? []
+
+    if (published.length === 0) {
+      // No host port: reachable only on the container network. The safe shape.
+      if (proxyEnabled(svc.labels)) proxied.push(svc.name)
+      else internal.push(svc.name)
+      continue
+    }
+
+    for (const binding of published) {
+      const parsed = parseBinding(binding)
+      if (!parsed) continue
+
+      // The proxy publishing 80/443 is the edge doing its job.
+      if (edgeServices.has(svc.name) && edgePorts.has(parsed.hostPort)) continue
+
+      const sensitive = SENSITIVE[parsed.containerPort] ?? SENSITIVE[parsed.hostPort]
+      const loop = isLoopback(parsed.hostIp)
+
+      if (loop) {
+        findings.push({
+          service: svc.name, file: svc.file, line: svc.line, binding, hostPort: parsed.hostPort,
+          exposure: 'loopback',
+          reason: sensitive
+            ? `${sensitive} bound to loopback — not internet-reachable, but any process on the host reaches it unproxied`
+            : 'Published to loopback only — bypasses the proxy for on-host callers',
+          severity: 'info',
+        })
+        continue
+      }
+
+      findings.push({
+        service: svc.name, file: svc.file, line: svc.line, binding, hostPort: parsed.hostPort,
+        exposure: 'public',
+        reason: sensitive
+          ? `${sensitive} published on a host port — reachable WITHOUT the proxy, so geo-gating, auth and rate limits do not apply`
+          : 'Published on a host port — reachable without traversing the proxy',
+        severity: sensitive ? 'critical' : 'high',
+      })
+    }
+
+    if (proxyEnabled(svc.labels)) proxied.push(svc.name)
+  }
+
+  // Worst first, so a critical never hides under a page of info lines.
+  const rank = { critical: 0, high: 1, info: 2 } as const
+  findings.sort((a, b) => rank[a.severity] - rank[b.severity] || a.service.localeCompare(b.service))
+
+  return {
+    findings,
+    proxied,
+    internal,
+    scanned: services.length,
+    // Nothing scanned is not a clean bill of health.
+    vacuous: services.length === 0,
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Convert a scan into the portfolio-standard report shape.
+ *
+ * Every finding carries the compose file (and line, when the caller's parser
+ * tracked one) plus the exact port mapping as the excerpt — so a reader can
+ * open the door being described rather than take its existence on trust.
+ *
+ * Loopback bindings map to `not-applicable`, not `pass`: the criterion is
+ * "reachable without traversing the proxy", and a loopback bind genuinely
+ * sits outside it while still being worth printing.
+ */
+export function toReport(r: ScanReport): CapabilityReport {
+  const findings: EvidenceFinding[] = r.findings.map((f, i) => ({
+    id: `sd-${i}`,
+    summary: `${f.service} publishes ${f.binding}`,
+    determination: f.exposure === 'loopback' ? 'not-applicable' : 'fail',
+    severity: f.severity as Severity,
+    detail: f.reason,
+    evidence: [evidence.file(f.file, f.line, f.binding, `service "${f.service}"`)],
+  }))
+
+  return {
+    capability: 'SideDoor',
+    scope: `${r.scanned} compose service${r.scanned === 1 ? '' : 's'}`,
+    examined: r.scanned,
+    findings,
+    notes: r.scanned === 0 ? [] : notesFor(r),
+  }
+}
+
+function notesFor(r: ScanReport): string[] {
+  const unproxied = r.findings.filter(f => f.exposure !== 'loopback').length
+  const notes = [
+    `proxied: ${r.proxied.length}   internal: ${r.internal.length}   unproxied bindings: ${unproxied}`,
+  ]
+  // Said explicitly rather than inferred from an absence of lines. The
+  // whole point of this capability is that a gap here is invisible, so its
+  // clean result has to be stated, not left as white space.
+  if (unproxied === 0) notes.push('No unproxied public bindings found.')
+  return notes
+}
+
+/**
+ * Render a scan for a terminal or CI log.
+ *
+ * Delegates to the shared evidence-record renderer, so SideDoor reads like
+ * every other library built on it. An empty scan reports NOT ASSESSED with the sentence
+ * explaining why that is not a pass — it used to say VACUOUS, which was
+ * precise and required a glossary.
+ */
+export function formatScan(r: ScanReport, opts: Parameters<typeof formatReport>[1] = {}): string {
+  return formatReport(toReport(r), opts)
+}

test/side-door.test.ts

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+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
+import { overall, validateReport } from '@extant2000/evidence-record'
+import { formatScan, parseBinding, scan, toReport, type ComposeService } from '../src/index.js'
+
+const svc = (name: string, ports?: string[], labels?: string[]): ComposeService =>
+  ({ name, file: 'docker-compose.yaml', ports, labels })
+
+describe('parseBinding', () => {
+  it('parses every compose port form', () => {
+    expect(parseBinding('8080:80')).toEqual({ hostPort: 8080, containerPort: 80 })
+    expect(parseBinding('127.0.0.1:5432:5432')).toEqual({ hostIp: '127.0.0.1', hostPort: 5432, containerPort: 5432 })
+    expect(parseBinding('8080:80/tcp')).toEqual({ hostPort: 8080, containerPort: 80 })
+  })
+
+  it('treats a bare port as published — it still opens a host port', () => {
+    expect(parseBinding('80')).toEqual({ hostPort: 80, containerPort: 80 })
+  })
+
+  it('returns null on junk rather than guessing', () => {
+    expect(parseBinding('not-a-port')).toBeNull()
+  })
+})
+
+describe('scan — the asymmetry this exists for', () => {
+  it('flags a sensitive service published on a host port as CRITICAL', () => {
+    // You can read the whole proxy config and never learn this door exists.
+    const r = scan([svc('db', ['5432:5432'])])
+    expect(r.findings[0]!.severity).toBe('critical')
+    expect(r.findings[0]!.reason).toContain('PostgreSQL')
+    expect(r.findings[0]!.reason).toContain('geo-gating, auth and rate limits do not apply')
+  })
+
+  it('flags SSH and the Docker API', () => {
+    expect(scan([svc('a', ['2222:22'])]).findings[0]!.reason).toContain('SSH')
+    expect(scan([svc('b', ['2375:2375'])]).findings[0]!.reason).toContain('Docker API')
+  })
+
+  it('rates a non-sensitive published port HIGH, not critical', () => {
+    expect(scan([svc('app', ['8080:80'])]).findings[0]!.severity).toBe('high')
+  })
+
+  it('downgrades loopback to info — real, but not internet-reachable', () => {
+    const f = scan([svc('db', ['127.0.0.1:5432:5432'])]).findings[0]!
+    expect(f.severity).toBe('info')
+    expect(f.exposure).toBe('loopback')
+    expect(f.reason).toContain('any process on the host reaches it unproxied')
+  })
+
+  it('does NOT flag the proxy publishing 80/443 — that IS the edge', () => {
+    const r = scan([svc('traefik', ['80:80', '443:443'])])
+    expect(r.findings).toHaveLength(0)
+  })
+
+  it('still flags the proxy publishing something else', () => {
+    expect(scan([svc('traefik', ['8080:8080'])]).findings).toHaveLength(1)
+  })
+
+  it('counts a service with no published ports as internal — the safe shape', () => {
+    const r = scan([svc('worker')])
+    expect(r.internal).toEqual(['worker'])
+    expect(r.findings).toHaveLength(0)
+  })
+
+  it('counts a labelled, unpublished service as proxied', () => {
+    const r = scan([svc('web', [], ['traefik.enable=true'])])
+    expect(r.proxied).toEqual(['web'])
+  })
+
+  it('a traefik label does NOT excuse a published port', () => {
+    // Being routable through the proxy says nothing about the door beside it.
+    const r = scan([svc('web', ['9000:9000'], ['traefik.enable=true'])])
+    expect(r.findings).toHaveLength(1)
+    expect(r.proxied).toContain('web')
+  })
+
+  it('sorts worst-first so a critical never hides under info lines', () => {
+    const r = scan([
+      svc('a', ['127.0.0.1:8096:8096']),
+      svc('b', ['8080:80']),
+      svc('c', ['5432:5432']),
+    ])
+    expect(r.findings.map(f => f.severity)).toEqual(['critical', 'high', 'info'])
+  })
+
+  it('reports an empty scan as NOT ASSESSED, never clean', () => {
+    const r = scan([])
+    expect(overall(toReport(r))).toBe('not-assessed')
+    const out = formatScan(r)
+    expect(out).toContain('NOT ASSESSED')
+    expect(out).toContain('not a pass')
+    expect(out).not.toContain('✓')
+    // The word it replaced needed a glossary.
+    expect(out).not.toContain('VACUOUS')
+  })
+
+  it('says so plainly when there is genuinely nothing public', () => {
+    const out = formatScan(scan([svc('traefik', ['443:443']), svc('worker')]))
+    expect(out).toContain('No unproxied public bindings found')
+  })
+})
+
+describe('conformance with the evidence-record standard', () => {
+  const real = scan([
+    svc('db', ['5432:5432']),
+    svc('cache', ['127.0.0.1:6379:6379']),
+    svc('traefik', ['80:80', '443:443']),
+    svc('worker'),
+  ])
+
+  it('every conclusion carries a citation', () => {
+    expect(validateReport(toReport(real))).toEqual([])
+  })
+
+  it('names the file and the exact binding, not just the service', () => {
+    const out = formatScan(real, { evidence: 'full' })
+    expect(out).toContain('docker-compose.yaml')
+    expect(out).toContain('5432:5432')
+    expect(out).toContain('service "db"')
+  })
+
+  it('carries a line number into the citation when the parser tracked one', () => {
+    const withLine: ComposeService = { name: 'db', file: 'compose.yml', line: 42, ports: ['5432:5432'] }
+    expect(formatScan(scan([withLine]))).toContain('compose.yml:42')
+  })
+
+  it('treats a loopback bind as not-applicable, not as a pass', () => {
+    // It is outside the criterion ("reachable without traversing the proxy")
+    // but still worth printing, and it is not evidence that anything passed.
+    const r = toReport(scan([svc('cache', ['127.0.0.1:6379:6379'])]))
+    expect(r.findings[0]!.determination).toBe('not-applicable')
+    expect(overall(r)).toBe('not-applicable')
+  })
+
+  it('a real bypass rolls the whole report up to a failure', () => {
+    expect(overall(toReport(real))).toBe('fail')
+  })
+
+  it('a genuinely clean scan is a pass, and says which criterion was met', () => {
+    const r = toReport(scan([svc('traefik', ['443:443']), svc('worker')]))
+    expect(overall(r)).toBe('pass')
+    expect(formatScan(scan([svc('traefik', ['443:443']), svc('worker')]))).toContain('✓')
+  })
+})

tsconfig.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "compilerOptions": {
+    "target": "ES2022", "module": "ES2022", "moduleResolution": "bundler",
+    "declaration": true, "outDir": "dist", "rootDir": "src",
+    "strict": true, "skipLibCheck": true
+  },
+  "include": ["src/**/*.ts"]
+}