From af56f810a8cfedf2b2fb2226b426ea3edb3a78a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Hitt <contact@extant2000.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2026 06:38:04 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Prod compose: record the hardening running on the box since
 2026-10-15

The box's compose got these during the security audit and the repo copy
did not, so a rebuild from the repo would have undone them:
- Redis requires a password (FN_REDIS_PASSWORD, written to a config file
  inside the container; healthcheck via REDISCLI_AUTH); FN_REDIS_URL
  carries it.
- The internal network is internal: true, so the database and Redis have
  no route off the box. The relay reaches S3 and APNs through web.
- relay, redis and obfs4bridge drop every capability; db keeps the five its
  entrypoint needs. All four set no-new-privileges.
- obfs4bridge is on web only.

.env.example documents FN_REDIS_PASSWORD. The deploy itself uses the
box's compose, so this changes nothing that is running.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 .env.example            |  5 +++++
 docker-compose.prod.yml | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/.env.example b/.env.example
index ad9b1a7..908c0dc 100644
--- a/.env.example
+++ b/.env.example
@@ -261,6 +261,11 @@ FN_ATTACHMENT_BYTES_PER_MONTH=524288000
 # .federated.yml run a Redis and set this themselves. Set it here only if you
 # point the base file at a Redis of your own.
 # FN_REDIS_URL=redis://redis:6379
+#
+# docker-compose.prod.yml gives its Redis a password. Set both, with the same
+# value: hex is safest, since the URL carries it unencoded.
+# FN_REDIS_PASSWORD=<openssl rand -hex 32>
+# FN_REDIS_URL=redis://:<same password>@redis:6379
 
 # Concurrency knobs, measured in docs/CAPACITY.md. Redis connections per event
 # loop: 32 by default for one relay, which waits in memory. With
diff --git a/docker-compose.prod.yml b/docker-compose.prod.yml
index 0f8eb7c..42d797b 100644
--- a/docker-compose.prod.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.prod.yml
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ services:
       POSTGRES_PASSWORD: "${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?set POSTGRES_PASSWORD in .env}"
     volumes:
       - relay-db:/var/lib/postgresql/data
+    security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
+    cap_drop: [ALL]
+    # The entrypoint fixes data-dir ownership and drops to the postgres user.
+    cap_add: [CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, FOWNER, SETGID, SETUID]
     networks: [internal]
     healthcheck:
       test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U flamenet -d flamenet"]
@@ -44,12 +48,22 @@ services:
   # takes out both. Not persisted on purpose, see the note in RoutesWake.swift.
   redis:
     image: redis:7-alpine
-    command: ["redis-server", "--save", "", "--appendonly", "no",
-              "--maxmemory", "64mb", "--maxmemory-policy", "allkeys-lru"]
+    # A password since 2026-10-15. It goes into a config file inside the
+    # container so it never appears in the host's process list; redis-cli
+    # reads it from REDISCLI_AUTH for the same reason. FN_REDIS_URL carries it
+    # as redis://:<password>@redis:6379.
+    user: redis
+    environment:
+      REDIS_PASSWORD: "${FN_REDIS_PASSWORD:?set FN_REDIS_PASSWORD in .env}"
+    command: ["sh", "-c", "printf 'requirepass %s\\n' \"$$REDIS_PASSWORD\" > /tmp/auth.conf && exec redis-server /tmp/auth.conf --save '' --appendonly no --maxmemory 64mb --maxmemory-policy allkeys-lru"]
     restart: unless-stopped
+    # No Linux capabilities beyond what the process needs, and no privilege
+    # gain through setuid binaries (security audit 2026-10-15).
+    security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
+    cap_drop: [ALL]
     networks: [internal]
     healthcheck:
-      test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "ping"]
+      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "REDISCLI_AUTH=\"$$REDIS_PASSWORD\" redis-cli ping | grep -q PONG"]
       interval: 10s
       timeout: 3s
       retries: 5
@@ -193,6 +207,10 @@ services:
       - .env
     volumes:
       - relay-attachments:/data/attachments
+    # No Linux capabilities beyond what the process needs, and no privilege
+    # gain through setuid binaries (security audit 2026-10-15).
+    security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
+    cap_drop: [ALL]
     networks: [web, internal]
     labels:
       traefik.enable: "true"
@@ -424,8 +442,13 @@ services:
       # start rather than silently re-key, so an unmounted volume fails loudly
       # instead of quietly breaking reconnects.
       - obfs4-state:/var/lib/obfs4
+    # No Linux capabilities beyond what the process needs, and no privilege
+    # gain through setuid binaries (security audit 2026-10-15).
+    security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
+    cap_drop: [ALL]
+    # Only on the web network: the bridge forwards to traefik:443 and needs
+    # nothing on internal, where the database and Redis live.
     networks:
-      internal: {}
       # On the edge proxy's network to reach 443, at a fixed address because
       # the proxy's PROXY-protocol trust is pinned to it. An unpinned address
       # can be handed to another container after a restart, and that
@@ -438,8 +461,11 @@ services:
 networks:
   web:
     external: true
+  # No route off the box (2026-10-15). The database and Redis need none; the
+  # relay reaches S3 and APNs through web.
   internal:
     driver: bridge
+    internal: true
 
 volumes:
   relay-db:
-- 
2.54.0