Signed prekeys rotate every 7 days. Identity keys never rotate at all — one compromise is permanent for the life of the device.
The log already records publish and revoke, so a rotation could be expressed as both, and contacts could follow it without a scary key-change prompt if the old key signs the new one.
Trade: a signed hand-off is exactly what an attacker with the old key would forge, so this needs care. Possibly the strongest argument for witness co-signing (#security 1).
⚠️ Idea, not a commitment. Filed 2026-09-01 during the code freeze — design and cost it, do not build it yet.
Signed prekeys rotate every 7 days. **Identity keys never rotate at all** — one compromise is permanent for the life of the device.
The log already records `publish` and `revoke`, so a rotation could be expressed as both, and contacts could follow it without a scary key-change prompt if the old key signs the new one.
**Trade:** a signed hand-off is exactly what an attacker with the old key would forge, so this needs care. Possibly the strongest argument for witness co-signing (#security 1).
---
⚠️ Idea, not a commitment. Filed 2026-09-01 during the code freeze — design and cost it, do not build it yet.
Blocking a user prevents them from interacting with repositories, such as opening or commenting on pull requests or issues. Learn more about blocking a user.
Signed prekeys rotate every 7 days. Identity keys never rotate at all — one compromise is permanent for the life of the device.
The log already records
publishandrevoke, so a rotation could be expressed as both, and contacts could follow it without a scary key-change prompt if the old key signs the new one.Trade: a signed hand-off is exactly what an attacker with the old key would forge, so this needs care. Possibly the strongest argument for witness co-signing (#security 1).
⚠️ Idea, not a commitment. Filed 2026-09-01 during the code freeze — design and cost it, do not build it yet.
Built and merged; deployed 2026-09-04.