A relay's `user_id` is a row number it assigned itself, and the account
service's pseudonym is HMAC'd per product precisely so two services cannot
correlate their users. Neither survives a trip to a second relay, so nothing
addressed by either can cross a relay boundary — which is the first thing
federation needs, and the reason a deleted relay currently takes its users'
names with it.
So identity becomes a key the client derives and holds: Ed25519, stretched from
the passphrase under `flamenet/account/identity/v1`, alongside the per-product
keys that already work this way. The public half, Crockford base32, is the
address. Derived rather than generated, so the same passphrase reproduces the
same fnid on a device that never held it — re-register the same key at a new
relay and contacts who pinned it are still talking to the same person.
Relay: `users.account_key` / `users.fnid` (unique in the database, not just in
the handler), `POST /e2e/account/identity` to claim by proving possession, and
`GET /e2e/account/identity/:handle` to resolve. The claim signature binds the
audience, the local user id and the key itself; dropping any one of the three
lets a claim be replayed at another relay, lifted onto another account here, or
transplanted onto another key. Verification uses the very key being registered,
so the relay confirms possession and never acquires an opinion about whose key
it is. Rotation is refused rather than silently overwritten — a new address
strands every contact that pinned the old one, and that needs a migration
record they can follow.
Log leaves go v1 -> v2, binding a subject instead of a row number: `fnid:<b32>`
where an account has enrolled, `local:<audience>/<user_id>` where it has not.
The fallback is qualified rather than bare because a device can be registered
before its key is claimed, and the alternatives were worse in both directions —
skipping those devices leaves a hole in the one record that must not have
holes, and logging them unqualified produces leaves that mean different things
depending on origin with nothing in the leaf to say so.
This is not a server-side change. All three engines hash the leaf and two of
them verify it against the relay, and a published vector pins the exact bytes,
so the format moves in one commit or not at all. Existing v1 leaves keep their
hashes and are backfilled to a self-describing `legacy-v1/` subject: the log is
append-only, and a format change is not a licence to rewrite history. The
version prefix sits inside the hashed bytes so a v1 leaf recomputed under v2
rules fails rather than verifying against a different subject.
Green: engine conformance 80, relay §8 suite 235 (10 new), JS<->Swift interop
74, Kotlin published vectors.
Two things found on the way, neither addressed here:
- iOS never calls `enforceKeyLog`. It and `requireKeyLog` are both declared in
E2EInbox and nothing reads either, so §19 is dead code on that client while
the JS one wires it. The subject is threaded through ready for a caller.
- `engine/test/interop/build.sh` prefers ~/Code/flamenetmessenger over the
checkout it is run from, so in a worktree it silently builds the wrong
sources and reports a *skip* rather than a failure. Set FNMSG_APP_DIR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
