d30a77dd1e432b9da3f820365ff807cdcd850195
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Paul HittandClaude Opus 5
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d30a77dd1e |
Android: contacts, conversations, and a message that made the round trip
The app now holds a conversation. A message typed into it reaches a different
program through the real relay, that program answers, and the answer appears in
the thread -- verified three times, end to end, encrypted the whole way.
96 JVM tests, 37 cross-engine, 11 on-device, plus live round trips against the
throwaway fleet.
What landed: a fan-out send that reaches every device a person has, inbox
polling, message history encrypted at rest, contacts, presence, and a session
that survives a restart. Plus `:interop:peer` -- a Flamenet account you can
drive from a shell, so the correspondent on the other end is not this app
talking to itself.
Three wire shapes were wrong, and only a real relay could say so:
- `prekeys`, not `opks`. The relay answered 200 and stored nothing, so the
device was published and could not be started with.
- The send body names the recipient once at the top, not per envelope.
- The buddy list is `id`/`presence`/`screen_name`, not `user_id`/`status`.
The second and third at least failed loudly. The first did not, which is why
the live tests exist.
Decisions worth stating:
A send returns partial success rather than throwing. One of someone's three
devices being unreachable must not stop the message reaching the other two, and
the UI says "delivered to 2 of 3" rather than "sent".
The inbox watermark advances per message, after it is decrypted AND stored --
never once for the batch, which would lose everything after a crash. An
undecryptable message advances it too: it is never going to decrypt, and
leaving it would re-fail on every poll for ever.
A sent line is recorded only once a device took it. Writing it first produces a
thread showing messages the recipient never got, which is worse than an error --
the sender believes they said something.
Opening a thread marks it read locally and tells the relay nothing. A read
receipt is a disclosure, and this product does not make one by default.
History is keyed by person, not device. Someone's phone and tablet are one
conversation, and filing by device would split it into threads each holding
half the story.
Also improves how instrumented failures report: the assertion now prints what
the screen was showing. That turned a bare 90-second timeout into "No value for
user_id" and then "Failed to connect to relay1" -- one a bug, one the emulator's
network, and previously indistinguishable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Paul HittandClaude Opus 5
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5f983c1455 |
Android: the app, and the two things only a phone could tell us
There is now a Flamenet Messenger app that installs, launches, creates an account on a self-hosted relay, registers a device, publishes prekeys, and stores all of it in an Android Keystore-backed vault. Verified on an emulator through the actual screens, not by unit test. 92 JVM tests, 37 cross-engine, 9 on-device, 3 against live relays. Two findings, both of which the JVM suite was structurally incapable of producing. **Android has no ordinary Ed25519 provider.** `KeyPairGenerator.Ed25519` and `KeyFactory.Ed25519` come from `AndroidKeyStore` and from nowhere else -- probed on API 35 rather than assumed -- and Keystore only makes keys it keeps. Every Ed25519 key in this engine is one we must hold: a device identity in our own vault, an account key derived from a passphrase. So the JCA route could never have worked. It compiled, passed 81 tests on a laptop, and threw "Not initialized" on the first launch on a phone. Worse, it was LATENT: a wrong password failed before any key was minted, so the error path worked perfectly while the happy path was broken. Ed25519 now uses BouncyCastle's `math.ec.rfc8032` core directly -- the engine's one real dependency, present because the platform leaves a hole, and a strictly better answer than the non-constant-time keygen it replaces. ProviderProbeTest records the measurement so nobody guesses again. **The prekey field is `prekeys`, not `opks`.** I guessed. The relay accepted the registration, returned 200, and stored nothing -- so the device was published and could not be started with, a failure with no error anywhere. Caught by a live test against the throwaway fleet, which exists because the same path through the emulator takes four minutes to say "timed out" and nothing about where. Two testing traps, recorded where they bite: An indeterminate progress spinner animates for ever, so Compose's test clock never goes idle and `waitUntil` never evaluates its condition -- it fails on the full timeout, reading as "sign-up is broken" when sign-up works. Auto-advance is now disabled around the wait only; disabling it for the whole test is the next mistake, because the app opens on a spinner while it reads the vault. Wiping the Keystore in `@Before` deletes the key the already-launched activity is holding, and every later write fails against a key that no longer exists. The test signs out through the UI instead, which is both safe and what a person does. Failure messages now include what the screen was showing. A bare timeout sends you to the network, the relay and the crypto in turn while the app has been displaying the reason the whole time. Also corrects a note that said this Mac had no Android SDK. It does. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |