Merge branch 'fix/v3-responder' into 'main'

Android 0.8 — sign-in identity, v3 responder, media scrubbing

See merge request paulhitt/flamenet-messenger-android!8

app/build.gradle.kts

@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ android {
         // ⚠️ Android also refuses to install an APK whose `versionCode` is
         // lower than the installed one, so a code that goes backwards makes a
         // release uninstallable for everybody already on the higher number.
-        versionCode = 7
+        versionCode = 8
-        versionName = "0.7"
+        versionName = "0.8"
         testInstrumentationRunner = "androidx.test.runner.AndroidJUnitRunner"
     }
 
@@ -105,6 +105,17 @@ android {
             // Debug keeps all four, because that is what runs on an emulator.
             ndk { abiFilters += setOf("arm64-v8a", "armeabi-v7a") }
             isMinifyEnabled = true
+            // 🔴 **R8 accepts a missing rules file in silence.** This one was
+            // referenced here and did not exist, so the release build shipped
+            // with the platform defaults alone — and answering a call aborted
+            // the process, because WebRTC's native JNI_OnLoad resolves its Java
+            // classes by name and R8 had renamed them. Nothing failed, nothing
+            // warned, and no debug test could see it. Fail the build instead.
+            file("proguard-rules.pro").takeIf { it.isFile }
+                ?: throw GradleException(
+                    "app/proguard-rules.pro is missing. The release build needs it — " +
+                        "without the org.webrtc keep rules, answering a call aborts the " +
+                        "process inside JNI_OnLoad with no Kotlin stack trace.")
             proguardFiles(getDefaultProguardFile("proguard-android-optimize.txt"), "proguard-rules.pro")
             signingConfig = signingConfigs.findByName("release")
         }

app/proguard-rules.pro

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# R8 rules for the release build.
+#
+# 🔴 **This file did not exist, and `build.gradle.kts` referenced it anyway.**
+# R8 accepts a missing `proguardFiles` entry in silence, so the release build
+# ran with the platform defaults alone and nobody was told. What that cost:
+# answering a call on a release build killed the process instantly —
+#
+#   Fatal signal 6 (SIGABRT), thread DefaultDispatch
+#     JNI_OnLoad  <- libjingle_peerconnection_so.so
+#     System.loadLibrary
+#     org.webrtc.PeerConnectionFactory
+#
+# — because WebRTC's native `JNI_OnLoad` resolves its Java classes **by name**,
+# and R8 had renamed them. The lookup fails and the library aborts the process
+# rather than throwing, so there is no Kotlin stack trace and nothing in the
+# call log: the app is gone before it can write one. Reported as "calling from
+# iOS to Android crashes Android when I hit answer" and, from the other side,
+# "iOS shows 2 calls, Android shows 0". One cause, two symptoms.
+#
+# ⚠️ **Debug builds cannot catch this and never will.** `connectedDebugAndroidTest`
+# runs the unminified variant, where every one of these classes still has its
+# real name. Every call test this project has ever run was blind to it. A
+# release-build call test is the only thing that would have.
+
+# --- WebRTC ----------------------------------------------------------------
+# Everything, members included: the native side looks up classes, methods AND
+# fields by their source names. Narrowing this to class names alone is the
+# tempting half-fix and it still aborts, in a different frame.
+-keep class org.webrtc.** { *; }
+-dontwarn org.webrtc.**
+
+# Any class holding native methods must keep those names, or the JNI binding
+# that pairs them by signature finds nothing.
+-keepclasseswithmembernames class * {
+    native <methods>;
+}
+
+# WebRTC marks its JNI entry points with this annotation. Keeping the
+# annotation itself is what lets the rule above stay meaningful after R8's
+# attribute stripping.
+-keepattributes *Annotation*,InnerClasses,Signature,EnclosingMethod
+
+# --- Conscrypt -------------------------------------------------------------
+# ⚠️ The engine selects Conscrypt explicitly by provider name (see
+# android/PARITY.md). Renaming its classes turns that selection into a silent
+# fallback to the JVM's own provider, which is a different implementation with
+# different behaviour — the exact class of divergence the parity tests exist
+# to catch, arriving only in release.
+-keep class org.conscrypt.** { *; }
+-dontwarn org.conscrypt.**

app/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/messenger/app/CallManager.kt

@@ -149,7 +149,21 @@ class CallManager(
         onGathered = null
         gatherGuard?.let { main.removeCallbacks(it) }
         gatherGuard = null
-        val sdp = connection?.localDescription?.description ?: return
+        // 🔴 **This `?: return` sent nobody anything, silently.** After the
+        // 8s gather timeout the local description can still be null — because
+        // setLocalDescription had not finished, or had FAILED and said nothing
+        // (see SimpleSdpObserver). The call then dies here: no offer, no
+        // envelope on the relay, no ring on the other phone, and no error.
+        // Verified against the database — zero envelopes had ever been created
+        // between two accounts that had "placed" several calls.
+        val sdp = connection?.localDescription?.description ?: run {
+            android.util.Log.w("fnmsg-call", "NOT SENDING the offer/answer: no localDescription after " +
+                "gathering (state=${connection?.iceGatheringState()}). " +
+                "The other side will never see this call.")
+            return
+        }
+        android.util.Log.i("fnmsg-call", "sending signal after gathering, sdp=${sdp.length} bytes, " +
+            "state=${connection?.iceGatheringState()}")
         send(sdp)
     }
 
@@ -213,7 +227,15 @@ class CallManager(
             continualGatheringPolicy = PeerConnection.ContinualGatheringPolicy.GATHER_ONCE
         }
         val observer = object : PeerConnection.Observer {
-            override fun onIceCandidate(candidate: IceCandidate?) = Unit
+            override fun onIceCandidate(candidate: IceCandidate?) {
+                // 🔴 The candidate TYPE is the whole diagnosis. `host` only
+                // means we never reached STUN/TURN and cannot cross a NAT;
+                // `relay` means TURN answered and the call can connect even
+                // when a direct path is impossible.
+                val sdp = candidate?.sdp ?: return
+                val kind = Regex("typ (\\w+)").find(sdp)?.groupValues?.get(1) ?: "?"
+                android.util.Log.i("fnmsg-call", "ice candidate: typ=$kind")
+            }
             override fun onIceCandidatesRemoved(candidates: Array<out IceCandidate>?) = Unit
             override fun onSignalingChange(state: PeerConnection.SignalingState?) = Unit
             // 🔴 **Nothing may throw out of here, and nothing may call back
@@ -222,6 +244,7 @@ class CallManager(
             // out — so ANY escaping Kotlin exception aborts the process:
             // SIGABRT, no AndroidRuntime trace, nothing to catch.
             override fun onIceConnectionChange(newState: PeerConnection.IceConnectionState?) {
+                android.util.Log.i("fnmsg-call", "ice connection -> $newState")
                 runCatching {
                 when (newState) {
                     PeerConnection.IceConnectionState.CONNECTED,
@@ -239,6 +262,7 @@ class CallManager(
             }
             override fun onIceConnectionReceivingChange(receiving: Boolean) = Unit
             override fun onIceGatheringChange(newState: PeerConnection.IceGatheringState?) {
+                android.util.Log.i("fnmsg-call", "ice gathering -> $newState")
                 // Hop to the main thread rather than touching the connection
                 // from here — same JNI rule as above: no WebRTC calls, and no
                 // exceptions, from inside a WebRTC callback.
@@ -327,7 +351,7 @@ class CallManager(
         }
         pc.createOffer(object : SimpleSdpObserver() {
             override fun onCreateSuccess(sdp: SessionDescription) {
-                pc.setLocalDescription(SimpleSdpObserver(), sdp)
+                pc.setLocalDescription(SimpleSdpObserver("offer:setLocal"), sdp)
                 // The complete SDP — with candidates — exists only after
                 // gathering; see onGathered. DIALLING holds until the answer
                 // arrives, so the caller's screen says what is actually true.
@@ -416,24 +440,18 @@ class CallManager(
     var onStaleOffer: ((Long, Long) -> Unit)? = null
 
     /** Accept the call that is ringing. */
-    fun accept(turn: JSONObject?) {
+    /**
-        val (fromUser, offer) = pendingOffer ?: return
+     * Build and send the answer. Split out so it can only be reached from
-        pendingOffer = null
+     * `setRemoteDescription`'s success callback — the ordering IS the fix.
-        val sdp = offer.sdp ?: return
+     */
-        state = State.CONNECTING
+    private fun answerNow(
-        armConnectGuard()
+        pc: PeerConnection,
-        val pc = open(turn, fromUser, offer.callId, offer.video) ?: run {
+        fromUser: Long,
-            state = State.IDLE
+        offer: Content.CallSignal,
-            return
+    ) {
-        }
+        pc.createAnswer(object : SimpleSdpObserver("answer:create") {
-        current = Active(offer.callId, fromUser, incoming = true, video = offer.video)
-        pc.setRemoteDescription(
-            SimpleSdpObserver(),
-            SessionDescription(SessionDescription.Type.OFFER, sdp),
-        )
-        pc.createAnswer(object : SimpleSdpObserver() {
             override fun onCreateSuccess(answer: SessionDescription) {
-                pc.setLocalDescription(SimpleSdpObserver(), answer)
+                pc.setLocalDescription(SimpleSdpObserver("answer:setLocal"), answer)
                 // Same as the offer: the answer is complete only after
                 // gathering, and one sent early names no address to reach.
                 main.post {
@@ -447,6 +465,39 @@ class CallManager(
         }, MediaConstraints())
     }
 
+    fun accept(turn: JSONObject?) {
+        val (fromUser, offer) = pendingOffer ?: return
+        pendingOffer = null
+        val sdp = offer.sdp ?: return
+        state = State.CONNECTING
+        armConnectGuard()
+        val pc = open(turn, fromUser, offer.callId, offer.video) ?: run {
+            state = State.IDLE
+            return
+        }
+        current = Active(offer.callId, fromUser, incoming = true, video = offer.video)
+        // 🔴 **`createAnswer` waits for the remote description to be APPLIED.**
+        // These two were fired back to back: `setRemoteDescription` is
+        // asynchronous, and WebRTC cannot answer an offer it has not finished
+        // reading. When it lost that race `createAnswer` failed,
+        // `setLocalDescription` never ran, and the send path found no local
+        // description and gave up — "NOT SENDING the offer/answer ... the other
+        // side will never see this call". Accepting a call did nothing, the
+        // caller rang on until it timed out, and neither end said why.
+        //
+        // ⚠️ It is a RACE, which is what made it look intermittent: on a quiet
+        // device the description often lands first and the call connects, so
+        // the same build both works and fails depending on load.
+        pc.setRemoteDescription(
+            object : SimpleSdpObserver("answer:setRemote") {
+                override fun onSetSuccess() {
+                    main.post { answerNow(pc, fromUser, offer) }
+                }
+            },
+            SessionDescription(SessionDescription.Type.OFFER, sdp),
+        )
+    }
+
     /** Refuse a ringing call, and say so rather than letting it ring out. */
     fun decline() {
         val (fromUser, offer) = pendingOffer ?: return
@@ -614,9 +665,24 @@ object PendingIncomingCall {
 }
 
 /** Most SDP callbacks have nothing to say; this stops four stubs per call site. */
-private open class SimpleSdpObserver : SdpObserver {
+/**
+ * 🔴 **This discarded every SDP failure, and that is why calls were undebuggable.**
+ * `createOffer` or `setLocalDescription` could fail for any reason and nothing
+ * anywhere recorded it — the offer then simply never went out, the callee never
+ * rang, and the database showed no envelope had ever been created. Four hours of
+ * "the call failed" with no cause, because the two callbacks that knew returned
+ * `Unit`.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ A `label` so the log says WHICH step failed. "setLocalDescription failed"
+ * and "createAnswer failed" send you to different places.
+ */
+private open class SimpleSdpObserver(private val label: String = "sdp") : SdpObserver {
     override fun onCreateSuccess(sdp: SessionDescription) = Unit
     override fun onSetSuccess() = Unit
-    override fun onCreateFailure(error: String?) = Unit
+    override fun onCreateFailure(error: String?) {
-    override fun onSetFailure(error: String?) = Unit
+        android.util.Log.w("fnmsg-call", "$label: createOffer/createAnswer FAILED: $error")
+    }
+    override fun onSetFailure(error: String?) {
+        android.util.Log.w("fnmsg-call", "$label: setLocal/setRemoteDescription FAILED: $error")
+    }
 }

app/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/messenger/app/ChatScreens.kt

@@ -712,6 +712,7 @@ fun ColumnScope.AccountScreen(
     var displayName by remember { mutableStateOf("") }
     var password by remember { mutableStateOf("") }
     var confirmingDelete by remember { mutableStateOf(false) }
+    var confirmingErase by remember { mutableStateOf(false) }
 
     Text("Account", style = MaterialTheme.typography.headlineMedium)
     Text(
@@ -876,9 +877,28 @@ fun ColumnScope.AccountScreen(
     SettingsSection {
         SettingsRow(
             label = "Sign out",
-            description = "Erases this phone's keys and stored messages. They cannot be recovered.",
+            description = "Ends this session and keeps your messages on this phone, "
+                + "so signing back in picks up where you left off.",
             tag = "sign-out",
-            onClick = model::signOut,
+            onClick = { model.signOut() },
+        )
+        // 🔴 **The one that erases is its own row, and is not the default.**
+        // Both used to be the same button: signing out for an afternoon
+        // destroyed this phone's identity, so coming back made every contact
+        // accept a safety-number change first. Erasing is a real thing people
+        // need — handing a phone on — but it is the rarer thing, and it must be
+        // chosen rather than stumbled into. Confirms in place, like the pair
+        // below it, because a dialog is dismissed reflexively.
+        SettingsRow(
+            label = if (confirmingErase) "Really erase — this cannot be undone"
+                    else "Sign out and erase this device",
+            description = "Also removes this phone's keys and stored messages. "
+                + "Choose this if you are handing the phone on.",
+            tag = "sign-out-erase",
+            onClick = {
+                if (confirmingErase) model.signOut(erasingDevice = true)
+                else confirmingErase = true
+            },
         )
         SettingsRow(
             label = if (confirmingDelete) "Really delete — this cannot be undone"
@@ -1083,6 +1103,13 @@ private fun ColumnScope.AppLockSection() {
  * ⚠️ There is no "public" option and cannot be one. A story only ever goes to
  * contacts, because it has to be encrypted to somebody in particular.
  */
+/** ⚠️ Plain words: "168 hours" would make the reader do the division. */
+private fun storyLifetimeLabel(hours: Int): String = when {
+    hours < 24 -> if (hours == 1) "1 hour" else "$hours hours"
+    hours == 24 -> "24 hours"
+    else -> (hours / 24).let { if (it == 1) "1 day" else "$it days" }
+}
+
 @Composable
 private fun ColumnScope.StoryAudienceSection(
     model: MessengerViewModel,
@@ -1139,6 +1166,42 @@ private fun ColumnScope.StoryAudienceSection(
         color = Palette.SecondaryText,
     )
 
+    Spacer(Modifier.height(Space.lg))
+    Text("How long your stories last", style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleMedium)
+
+    // 🔴 A day used to be the only answer. The expiry rides inside the sealed
+    // story, so this is the poster's choice travelling with every copy — not a
+    // rule the relay is being asked to keep.
+    val storyContext = LocalContext.current
+    val mediaSettings = remember { MediaSettings(storyContext) }
+    var storyHours by remember { mutableStateOf(mediaSettings.storyLifetimeHours) }
+    Row(
+        modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth().padding(vertical = Space.sm),
+        horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(Space.sm),
+    ) {
+        MediaSettings.STORY_LIFETIME_CHOICES.forEach { hours ->
+            KitChip(
+                text = storyLifetimeLabel(hours),
+                selected = storyHours == hours,
+                onClick = {
+                    storyHours = hours
+                    mediaSettings.storyLifetimeHours = hours
+                },
+                tag = "story-lifetime-$hours",
+            )
+        }
+    }
+    Text(
+        // ⚠️ Says what it does NOT promise. "Disappears after" alone reads as a
+        // guarantee about other people's phones, and a viewer who screenshots a
+        // story has it for good.
+        "Stories you post from now on disappear after this long, on your device "
+            + "and your contacts'. Ones already posted keep the time they were "
+            + "sent with.",
+        fontSize = 14.sp,
+        color = Palette.SecondaryText,
+    )
+
     // The list only earns its place when the mode uses one.
     if (audience.mode != Session.AudienceMode.EVERYONE) {
         if (phase.buddies.isEmpty()) {

app/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/messenger/app/MainActivity.kt

@@ -479,7 +479,13 @@ private fun ColumnScope.SignIn(model: MessengerViewModel, phase: MessengerViewMo
     }
 
     TextButton(
-        onClick = { registering = !registering },
+        onClick = {
+            registering = !registering
+            // The last attempt's message was about the OTHER mode; leaving it
+            // up makes switching look like it failed.
+            ageError = null
+            model.clearAuthError()
+        },
         modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth().testTag("toggle-register"),
     ) {
         Text(if (registering) "I already have an account" else "Create an account")

app/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/messenger/app/MediaScrub.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+package io.flamenet.messenger.app
+
+import android.media.MediaCodec
+import android.media.MediaExtractor
+import android.media.MediaFormat
+import android.media.MediaMuxer
+import java.io.File
+import java.nio.ByteBuffer
+
+/**
+ * Strip everything from a video except the pictures and the sound.
+ *
+ * 🔴 **A clip from the camera roll says where it was shot.** Android writes the
+ * capture location into the MP4 container — the `©xyz` / `location` atom — and
+ * the story path used to hand the picked file over byte for byte, so posting a
+ * video told every viewer the coordinates of wherever the person happened to
+ * be. Nothing on screen suggested it and no setting controlled it. Photos were
+ * already safe by accident, because [ImagePrep] re-encodes them through a
+ * bitmap and `Bitmap.compress` writes no EXIF; video had no equivalent step at
+ * all.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ **A remux, not a transcode.** The samples are copied across untouched, so
+ * there is no quality loss and no codec work — the container is rebuilt and the
+ * metadata simply is not carried over. That is cheap enough to do on every
+ * post, which matters: a scrub people wait for is a scrub somebody eventually
+ * makes optional.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ Rotation IS carried over, deliberately. It says which way up the phone
+ * was, not where it was, and dropping it plays every portrait clip on its side.
+ */
+object MediaScrub {
+
+    /**
+     * @param source the picked video's bytes.
+     * @param rotationDegrees from `METADATA_KEY_VIDEO_ROTATION`, re-applied to
+     *   the rebuilt file.
+     * @return scrubbed bytes, or null if the file could not be rebuilt — the
+     *   caller must then refuse the post rather than fall back to the original.
+     */
+    fun videoWithoutMetadata(
+        source: ByteArray,
+        rotationDegrees: Int,
+        cacheDir: File,
+    ): ByteArray? {
+        val input = File.createTempFile("scrub-in", ".mp4", cacheDir)
+        val output = File.createTempFile("scrub-out", ".mp4", cacheDir)
+        var extractor: MediaExtractor? = null
+        var muxer: MediaMuxer? = null
+        var started = false
+        return try {
+            input.writeBytes(source)
+
+            extractor = MediaExtractor()
+            extractor.setDataSource(input.absolutePath)
+            muxer = MediaMuxer(output.absolutePath, MediaMuxer.OutputFormat.MUXER_OUTPUT_MPEG_4)
+
+            // Audio and video only. Anything else in the file — timed text, a
+            // sensor track, whatever a particular camera app decided to add —
+            // is exactly the kind of passenger this exists to leave behind.
+            val trackMap = HashMap<Int, Int>()
+            var bufferSize = DEFAULT_BUFFER
+            for (i in 0 until extractor.trackCount) {
+                val format = extractor.getTrackFormat(i)
+                val mime = format.getString(MediaFormat.KEY_MIME) ?: continue
+                if (!mime.startsWith("video/") && !mime.startsWith("audio/")) continue
+                if (format.containsKey(MediaFormat.KEY_MAX_INPUT_SIZE)) {
+                    bufferSize = maxOf(bufferSize, format.getInteger(MediaFormat.KEY_MAX_INPUT_SIZE))
+                }
+                extractor.selectTrack(i)
+                trackMap[i] = muxer.addTrack(format)
+            }
+            if (trackMap.isEmpty()) return null
+
+            muxer.setOrientationHint(rotationDegrees)
+            muxer.start()
+            started = true
+
+            val buffer = ByteBuffer.allocate(bufferSize)
+            val info = MediaCodec.BufferInfo()
+            while (true) {
+                val track = extractor.sampleTrackIndex
+                if (track < 0) break
+                val size = extractor.readSampleData(buffer, 0)
+                if (size < 0) break
+                val target = trackMap[track]
+                if (target != null) {
+                    info.offset = 0
+                    info.size = size
+                    info.presentationTimeUs = extractor.sampleTime
+                    // ⚠️ Mapped rather than assigned across. The extractor's
+                    // flags and the codec's are different vocabularies that
+                    // happen to agree on the value of "sync sample" today.
+                    info.flags =
+                        if (extractor.sampleFlags and MediaExtractor.SAMPLE_FLAG_SYNC != 0) {
+                            MediaCodec.BUFFER_FLAG_KEY_FRAME
+                        } else {
+                            0
+                        }
+                    muxer.writeSampleData(target, buffer, info)
+                }
+                extractor.advance()
+            }
+            output.readBytes()
+        } catch (failure: Exception) {
+            null
+        } finally {
+            if (started) runCatching { muxer?.stop() }
+            runCatching { muxer?.release() }
+            runCatching { extractor?.release() }
+            runCatching { input.delete() }
+            runCatching { output.delete() }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private const val DEFAULT_BUFFER = 1 shl 20
+}

app/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/messenger/app/MediaSettings.kt

@@ -24,6 +24,31 @@ class MediaSettings(context: Context) {
         get() = prefs.getBoolean(FULL_QUALITY, false)
         set(value) = prefs.edit().putBoolean(FULL_QUALITY, value).apply()
 
+    /**
+     * How long a story posted from this phone stays visible, in hours.
+     *
+     * 🔴 **A day was the only answer the app had.** The lifetime was a
+     * constant, so the one thing people actually want to change about a story
+     * — how long it lasts — was the one thing they could not.
+     *
+     * ⚠️ The choice is the SENDER's and rides inside the sealed envelope
+     * (`exp`, §6.6), so it does not ask the relay to keep a promise: every copy
+     * carries the expiry its poster chose.
+     *
+     * ⚠️ Clamped to the offered set on read. A value from a future build, or a
+     * corrupted preference, must not post a story that expires before anybody
+     * sees it — which is what a raw 0 would do.
+     */
+    var storyLifetimeHours: Int
+        get() {
+            val stored = prefs.getInt(STORY_LIFETIME_HOURS, STORY_LIFETIME_DEFAULT)
+            return if (stored in STORY_LIFETIME_CHOICES) stored else STORY_LIFETIME_DEFAULT
+        }
+        set(value) = prefs.edit().putInt(STORY_LIFETIME_HOURS, value).apply()
+
+    /** Seconds, as [io.flamenet.client.Conversations.postStory] wants it. */
+    val storyLifetimeSeconds: Double get() = storyLifetimeHours * 60.0 * 60.0
+
     /**
      * Refuse to send unless the relay can prove the recipient's keys appear in
      * the log it publishes.
@@ -61,6 +86,10 @@ class MediaSettings(context: Context) {
         private const val PREFS = "media-settings"
         private const val REQUIRE_KEY_LOG = "requireKeyLog"
         private const val FULL_QUALITY = "full_quality"
+        private const val STORY_LIFETIME_HOURS = "stories.lifetimeHours"
+        const val STORY_LIFETIME_DEFAULT = 24
+        /** ⚠️ Same set as iOS, so the two apps offer the same thing. */
+        val STORY_LIFETIME_CHOICES = listOf(1, 6, 24, 72, 168)
         private const val LINK_PREVIEWS = "link_previews"
     }
 }

app/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/messenger/app/MessengerViewModel.kt

@@ -404,6 +404,22 @@ class MessengerViewModel(app: Application) : AndroidViewModel(app) {
         )
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Forget whatever the last sign-in attempt said.
+     *
+     * 🔴 **Switching between signing in and creating an account has to do
+     * this.** The message belongs to the mode it was produced in — "that
+     * handle is already taken" is advice about signing up, and it stayed on
+     * screen after the person took that advice and switched to signing in,
+     * where it reads as a refusal of the thing they are now trying to do.
+     */
+    fun clearAuthError() {
+        val current = _phase.value
+        if (current is Phase.SignedOut && current.error != null) {
+            _phase.value = current.copy(error = null)
+        }
+    }
+
     fun signIn(handle: String, passphrase: String, register: Boolean, email: String = "") {
         val config = site ?: run {
             _phase.value = Phase.SignedOut(error = "That doesn't look like a server address.")
@@ -490,7 +506,23 @@ class MessengerViewModel(app: Application) : AndroidViewModel(app) {
         }
 
         val vault = vault ?: error("the vault is not open")
-        val device = identity ?: DeviceIdentity.create().also {
+        // 🔴 **The stored identity FIRST, and this line is why signing out and
+        // back in used to cost every contact a prompt.** Sign-in only ever
+        // consulted the in-memory field, and sign-out clears it — so it minted
+        // a fresh identity and overwrote the vault's, making this phone a brand
+        // new device on every sign-in. Contacts saw a safety-number change,
+        // sends were refused until they accepted it, and the relay's public key
+        // log had not yet caught up with the key being offered, so even after
+        // accepting, the next send failed on "the keys offered by this contact
+        // are not in the public log".
+        //
+        // ⚠️ It was harmless right up until it wasn't: sign-out used to destroy
+        // the vault, so there was never a stored identity to find and minting
+        // one was correct. Keeping the device across a plain sign-out is what
+        // turned this into the bug it always looked like.
+        val device = identity
+            ?: vault.loadIdentity()?.also { identity = it }
+            ?: DeviceIdentity.create().also {
                 vault.saveIdentity(it)
                 identity = it
             }
@@ -1376,7 +1408,7 @@ class MessengerViewModel(app: Application) : AndroidViewModel(app) {
     fun deleteAccount() = viewModelScope.launch {
         val current = session ?: return@launch
         val done = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { runCatching { current.api.deleteAccount() } }
-        done.onSuccess { signOut() }
+        done.onSuccess { signOut(erasingDevice = true) }
             .onFailure { failure -> update { it.copy(error = describe(failure)) } }
     }
 
@@ -1947,7 +1979,9 @@ class MessengerViewModel(app: Application) : AndroidViewModel(app) {
             val done = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
                 runCatching {
                     current.postStory(bytes, mime, width, height, caption, recipients,
-                                      duration, streamUrl)
+                                      duration, streamUrl,
+                                      lifetimeSeconds = MediaSettings(getApplication())
+                                          .storyLifetimeSeconds)
                 }
             }
             done.onSuccess { posted ->
@@ -2438,13 +2472,45 @@ class MessengerViewModel(app: Application) : AndroidViewModel(app) {
                 + "new device.")
     }
 
-    fun signOut() = viewModelScope.launch {
+    /**
+     * End the session, and optionally erase this phone with it.
+     *
+     * 🔴 **Signing out used to cost every one of your contacts a prompt.** It
+     * destroyed the vault unconditionally, so signing back in was a genuinely
+     * NEW device: every contact had the old key pinned, saw a safety-number
+     * change, and could not message you until they accepted it. For someone
+     * stepping away for an afternoon that is a strange price to pay, and it is
+     * why signing out and back in kept looking like the app breaking.
+     *
+     * Two doors now. Plain sign-out ends the session and keeps the device, so
+     * coming back is silent. Erasing is for handing the phone on, and for
+     * deleting the account, and the settings screen says which is which.
+     *
+     * ⚠️ Keeping the keys does not leave the mailbox reachable: a relay token
+     * is minted against the account credential, which this clears either way.
+     */
+    fun signOut(erasingDevice: Boolean = false) = viewModelScope.launch {
         polling?.cancel()
         polling = null
+        val current = session
+        val myDevice = identity?.deviceId
         session = null
-        withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { KeystoreVault.destroy(getApplication()) }
+        if (erasingDevice) {
+            withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
+                // ⚠️ Tell the relay BEFORE destroying the keys that authorise
+                // saying it. Otherwise the account goes on publishing a device
+                // nobody will ever read again, and fan-out is per device — so
+                // contacts keep addressing copies to a dead mailbox while the
+                // relay reports every one of them delivered. Best effort: a bad
+                // network must not leave the phone half-erased.
+                if (myDevice != null) runCatching { current?.revokeDevice(myDevice) }
+                KeystoreVault.destroy(getApplication())
+            }
             identity = null
             vault = KeystoreVault.open(getApplication())
+        } else {
+            identity = null
+        }
         _phase.value = Phase.SignedOut()
     }
 
@@ -2460,7 +2526,11 @@ class MessengerViewModel(app: Application) : AndroidViewModel(app) {
 
         is AccountsClient.Failure.HandleTaken -> "That handle is already taken."
         is AccountsClient.Failure.RateLimited -> "Too many attempts. Wait a few minutes."
-        is AccountsClient.Failure.Transport -> failure.message.orEmpty()
+        // ⚠️ Not the underlying message: at this layer it is a Java networking
+        // string ("Failed to connect to /10.0.2.2:443"), which names an address
+        // the person never typed.
+        is AccountsClient.Failure.Transport ->
+            "Couldn't reach that server. Check the address and your connection."
         // ⚠️ NOT "that passphrase is wrong". The relay rejects a TOKEN, which
         // the user never typed and cannot check. Telling them their passphrase
         // is wrong when their session merely aged out sends them off to change
@@ -2477,7 +2547,27 @@ class MessengerViewModel(app: Application) : AndroidViewModel(app) {
                 if (mins == 1) "." else "s."
         } ?: "Too many attempts. Wait a few minutes."
         is Vault.Corrupt -> "This phone's stored keys could not be read."
-        else -> failure.message ?: "Something went wrong reaching that server."
+
+        // 🔴 **Anything not named above used to reach the screen verbatim.**
+        // `RelayException.Http` carries "relay returned 409: {body}" as its
+        // message, so somebody choosing a handle that was already in use was
+        // shown a status code and a JSON fragment. Nothing in that tells them
+        // to pick a different name, which is the entire content of the answer.
+        //
+        // ⚠️ The body is deliberately dropped rather than appended. It is
+        // written for whoever is reading the logs, and half of these carry the
+        // handle back in it.
+        is RelayException.Http -> when (failure.status) {
+            409 -> "That handle is already taken. Try a different one."
+            400, 422 -> "That server couldn't accept those details. " +
+                "Check the handle and try again."
+            403 -> "That isn't allowed on this server."
+            in 500..599 -> "That server is having trouble right now. " +
+                "Try again in a moment."
+            else -> "That server couldn't complete this. Try again in a moment."
+        }
+        is RelayException.Malformed -> "That server sent back something unexpected."
+        else -> "Something went wrong reaching that server."
     }
 
     /**

app/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/messenger/app/Session.kt

@@ -630,8 +630,21 @@ class Session(
     }
 
     /** TURN credentials, or null when this relay has none configured. */
+    /**
+     * 🔴 **A null here silently downgrades every call to STUN-only.**
+     * `CallManager.iceServers(null)` falls back to Google's STUN server, which
+     * cannot relay — so two peers behind NAT never connect, the call "just
+     * fails", and coturn records nothing because it was never contacted. The
+     * failure was swallowed by `getOrNull()`, so nothing anywhere said why.
+     */
     fun turnCredentials(): org.json.JSONObject? =
-        runCatching { relay.turnCredentials() }.getOrNull()
+        runCatching { relay.turnCredentials() }
+            .onFailure {
+                android.util.Log.w("fnmsg-call", "no TURN credentials " +
+                    "(${it.javaClass.simpleName}: ${it.message}) — this call will use " +
+                    "STUN only and will not connect across NAT", it)
+            }
+            .getOrNull()
 
     fun sendGroup(group: RelayClient.Group, text: String): Conversations.Sent {
         val sent = conversations.sendToGroup(group, text, userId)
@@ -749,6 +762,13 @@ class Session(
             if (gid != null) {
                 val known = groupRoster(gid)
                 if (known == null || message.fromUser !in known) {
+                    // ⚠️ Refusing is correct — but refusing in silence is what
+                    // made a sealed group look like a group nobody could talk
+                    // in. Say which group and which sender, never the message.
+                    System.err.println(
+                        "fnmsg-recv: NOT FILED into group ${gid.take(8)} — " +
+                            "sender ${message.fromUser} is not in the roster " +
+                            "(roster ${known?.size ?: -1} member(s))")
                     continue
                 }
                 // ⚠️ Every group envelope carries the group's name, and this is
@@ -886,8 +906,16 @@ class Session(
         duration: Double = 0.0,
         /** A live stream this story embeds (§6.13); [bytes] is then the poster. */
         streamUrl: String? = null,
+        /**
+         * ⚠️ Passed explicitly rather than left to the client's default. The
+         * default is 24 hours and the setting exists precisely so that is not
+         * the only answer; a call site that omits it silently ignores what the
+         * person chose.
+         */
+        lifetimeSeconds: Double,
     ): io.flamenet.client.Conversations.StoryPosted {
         val posted = conversations.postStory(bytes, mime, width, height, caption, toUserIds,
+                                             lifetimeSeconds = lifetimeSeconds,
                                              duration = duration, streamUrl = streamUrl)
         if (posted.reached > 0) {
             val now = System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000.0
@@ -1231,6 +1259,16 @@ class Session(
     @Volatile var groupNamesUpdated: Boolean = false
 
     private fun groupRoster(gid: String): Set<Long>? {
+        // 🔴 **A SEALED group's roster is not the relay's to give.** §8.9b
+        // exists so the relay holds opaque tags and no membership at all, so
+        // `listGroups()` returns an EMPTY member list for one — and the caller
+        // reads that as "the sender is not a member" and drops the message.
+        // Every message in every sealed group was discarded on arrival, in
+        // silence, by the check meant to protect it. The sealed roster is the
+        // authoritative list here and the only one that exists.
+        if (vault.groupSecrets(gid) != null) {
+            return sealedGroups().firstOrNull { it.id == gid }?.memberIds?.toSet()
+        }
         val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
         val cached = groupRosterCache
         if (cached != null && now - cached.first < 30_000) return cached.second[gid]

app/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/messenger/app/StoryMedia.kt

@@ -28,14 +28,23 @@ import java.io.File
 /**
  * Staging a picked story, image or video, from either entry point.
  *
- * Videos are validated, not transcoded: this platform has no built-in
+ * Videos are validated and scrubbed, not transcoded: this platform has no
- * exporter the way AVFoundation is one, and pulling in a transcoding stack
+ * built-in exporter the way AVFoundation is one, and pulling in a transcoding
- * is a decision for later. So the caps are enforced honestly — a clip too
+ * stack is a decision for later. So the caps are enforced honestly — a clip too
- * long or too heavy is refused with the reason, and a clip that fits goes
+ * long or too heavy is refused with the reason — and a clip that fits is
- * out exactly as picked.
+ * remuxed to drop the container metadata before it goes out. See [MediaScrub];
+ * "exactly as picked" used to include the capture location.
  */
 object StoryMedia {
 
+    /** Duration in seconds, display dimensions, and the container rotation. */
+    private data class Meta(
+        val seconds: Double,
+        val width: Int,
+        val height: Int,
+        val rotation: Int,
+    )
+
     /** A story is a moment, not a film — same cap as iOS. */
     const val MAX_DURATION_S = 30
     /** Under the relay's 10 MB attachment cap, with room for the seal. */
@@ -66,27 +75,40 @@ object StoryMedia {
                     ?.toIntOrNull() ?: 0
                 // A portrait phone clip is stored landscape plus a rotation.
                 if (rotation == 90 || rotation == 270) { val t = w; w = h; h = t }
-                Triple(durationMs / 1000.0, w, h)
+                // ⚠️ The rotation is carried out of here now, not just used to
+                // swap the dimensions: rebuilding the container to strip its
+                // metadata drops the orientation with everything else, and a
+                // portrait story would play on its side.
+                Meta(durationMs / 1000.0, w, h, rotation)
             }.getOrNull().also { runCatching { retriever.release() } }
 
             if (meta == null) {
                 model.reportStoryProblem("That video couldn't be read.")
                 return
             }
-            val (seconds, w, h) = meta
+            val (seconds, w, h, rotation) = meta
             if (seconds > MAX_DURATION_S + 0.5) {
                 model.reportStoryProblem(
                     "Stories are capped at $MAX_DURATION_S seconds — this one is "
                         + "${seconds.toInt()}. Trim it and try again.")
                 return
             }
-            val bytes = runCatching {
+            val picked = runCatching {
                 context.contentResolver.openInputStream(uri)?.use { it.readBytes() }
             }.getOrNull()
-            if (bytes == null) {
+            if (picked == null) {
                 model.reportStoryProblem("That video couldn't be read.")
                 return
             }
+            // 🔴 **Where it was shot does not go with it.** See [MediaScrub].
+            // A failure here refuses the post rather than falling back to the
+            // original: "we could not remove the location, so we sent it
+            // anyway" is the one outcome this must never produce.
+            val bytes = MediaScrub.videoWithoutMetadata(picked, rotation, context.cacheDir)
+            if (bytes == null) {
+                model.reportStoryProblem("That video couldn't be prepared for sending.")
+                return
+            }
             if (bytes.size > MAX_BYTES) {
                 model.reportStoryProblem(
                     "That video is too large to send — the cap is about 9 MB. "
@@ -97,16 +119,25 @@ object StoryMedia {
             return
         }
 
-        val bytes = runCatching {
+        val picked = runCatching {
             context.contentResolver.openInputStream(uri)?.use { it.readBytes() }
         }.getOrNull()
-        if (bytes == null) {
+        if (picked == null) {
             model.reportStoryProblem("That file couldn't be read.")
             return
         }
-        val bounds = android.graphics.BitmapFactory.Options().apply { inJustDecodeBounds = true }
+        // 🔴 **Prepared, not posted as picked.** A story photo was the one
-        android.graphics.BitmapFactory.decodeByteArray(bytes, 0, bytes.size, bounds)
+        // image path in the app that never went through [ImagePrep], so it was
-        model.stageStory(bytes, mime, bounds.outWidth, bounds.outHeight)
+        // uploaded with its EXIF block intact — including, for anything shot on
+        // the phone, the GPS coordinates. Chat photos have always been
+        // re-encoded and were safe by consequence; a story, which is shown to
+        // every contact at once, was not.
+        val prepared = ImagePrep.prepare(picked, MediaSettings(context).fullQuality)
+        if (prepared == null) {
+            model.reportStoryProblem("That picture couldn't be read.")
+            return
+        }
+        model.stageStory(prepared.bytes, prepared.mime, prepared.width, prepared.height)
     }
 
     /** The first frame, for the composer's preview of a staged video. */

client/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/client/Conversations.kt

@@ -501,7 +501,11 @@ class Conversations(
      * request happens to verify is the mistake this whole section exists to
      * avoid.
      */
-    private fun guardIdentity(toUserId: Long, bundles: List<PeerBundle>) {
+    private fun guardIdentity(
+        toUserId: Long,
+        bundles: List<PeerBundle>,
+        servedFnid: String? = null,
+    ) {
         val theirs = bundles.filter { it.deviceId != identity.deviceId }
         if (theirs.isEmpty()) return
 
@@ -513,7 +517,11 @@ class Conversations(
         ) {
             throw IdentityChangedException(toUserId)
         }
-        theirs.forEach { trust.enforceKeyLogIfServed(it, toUserId) }
+        // The address just served wins over the pinned one: a device that
+        // registered a moment ago is logged under whatever the account claims
+        // NOW, and the pin may predate the claim.
+        val fnid = servedFnid ?: pinned
+        theirs.forEach { trust.enforceKeyLogIfServed(it, toUserId, fnid) }
     }
 
     /**
@@ -524,6 +532,28 @@ class Conversations(
     fun sendPlaintextForGroupInvite(toUserId: Long, text: String): Sent =
         sendPlaintext(toUserId, text)
 
+    /**
+     * Whether an envelope is worth interrupting somebody for.
+     *
+     * 🔴 **Everything this app sends was.** The relay holds ciphertext and
+     * cannot tell a call answer from a birthday message, so it announced every
+     * envelope as "New message" — and call answers, call ends, delivery keys,
+     * key-log gossip, reactions and avatars are all envelopes. One call
+     * produced a burst of banners on the far end for things nobody sent.
+     *
+     * ⚠️ A plain string is a message: text from an older build carries no
+     * envelope at all, and the safe reading of something unrecognised is that a
+     * person meant to say it.
+     */
+    private fun warrantsAlert(body: String): Boolean {
+        if (!body.startsWith("""{"fnc":""")) return true
+        val content = Content.parse(body)
+        // Only the OFFER announces itself. An answer and a hang-up are the far
+        // end's half of a conversation already on screen.
+        content.call?.let { return it.action == Content.CallSignal.OFFER }
+        return content.isRenderable
+    }
+
     private fun sendPlaintext(toUserId: Long, text: String): Sent {
         // 🔴 **The DIRECTORY, not the key route.** `/e2e/keys` pops a one-time
         // prekey per device and is metered per contact pair — calling it on
@@ -567,13 +597,34 @@ class Conversations(
         val needsEstablish = stubs.any {
             it.deviceId != identity.deviceId && existingSession(it.deviceId) == null
         }
+        // ⚠️ The address comes back with the bundles and is REMEMBERED. The
+        // directory route serves no fnid, so a later send that needs no bundle
+        // would otherwise be unable to check the log again.
+        var servedFnid: String? = null
         val bundles = if (!needsEstablish) stubs else {
-            val full = relay.fetchKeys(toUserId).associateBy { it.deviceId }
+            val keys = relay.fetchKeys(toUserId)
+            servedFnid = keys.fnid
+            keys.fnid?.let { trust.rememberFnid(toUserId, it) }
+            val full = keys.bundles.associateBy { it.deviceId }
             // Union: every device the directory knows, carrying a full bundle
             // where the key route returned one.
             stubs.map { full[it.deviceId] ?: it }
         }
-        guardIdentity(toUserId, bundles)
+        // 🔴 **The send path had no logging at all, and that is why a message
+        // that never left the phone was indistinguishable from one that did.**
+        // The relay records refusals, so an absent POST looks identical to a
+        // successful one from the server side; only this side knows.
+        System.err.println("fnmsg-send: to=$toUserId stubs=${stubs.size} " +
+            "bundles=${bundles.size} mine=${identity.deviceId}")
+        try {
+            guardIdentity(toUserId, bundles, servedFnid)
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            System.err.println("fnmsg-send: REFUSED by guardIdentity " +
+                "(${e.javaClass.simpleName}: ${e.message}) — nothing will be sent. " +
+                "This fires when the peer's identity key changed, e.g. after they " +
+                "reinstalled or the account was recreated.")
+            throw e
+        }
         val delivered = mutableListOf<String>()
         val failed = LinkedHashMap<String, String>()
         val outgoing = mutableListOf<RelayClient.ToDevice>()
@@ -594,6 +645,8 @@ class Conversations(
         // above call this once per member with no try around it — throwing
         // would abandon everyone after the first person who is signed out.
         if (bundles.none { it.deviceId != identity.deviceId }) {
+            System.err.println("fnmsg-send: NOT SENDING — the recipient has no " +
+                "device other than ours (bundles=${bundles.map { it.deviceId }})")
             failed["user:$toUserId"] = "not signed in on any device"
             return Sent(delivered, failed, sealed = false)
         }
@@ -626,6 +679,15 @@ class Conversations(
                         bundle.deviceId, wrap(pre, bundle, sealed))
                 }
                 val envelope = session.encrypt(text)
+                // ⚠️ Protocol shape only — version and whether the post-quantum
+                // half of the ratchet step is on the wire. A v3 peer refuses a
+                // step without it, and nothing on this side reported what we
+                // actually emitted.
+                System.err.println(
+                    "fnmsg-send: envelope v${envelope.version} ${envelope.type} " +
+                        "n=${envelope.header.n} pqdh=${envelope.header.pqdh != null} " +
+                        "pqct=${envelope.header.pqct != null} " +
+                        "sessionVersion=${session.version}")
                 // Saved BEFORE the network call. If the relay accepts the
                 // envelope and we then crash, the peer has a message our
                 // ratchet has not advanced past, and nothing either side can
@@ -640,10 +702,23 @@ class Conversations(
             }
         }
 
+        if (outgoing.isEmpty()) {
+            System.err.println("fnmsg-send: NOT SENDING — every device failed to " +
+                "encrypt: $failed")
+        }
         if (outgoing.isNotEmpty()) {
+            System.err.println("fnmsg-send: POSTing ${outgoing.size} envelope(s) to " +
+                "/e2e/messages for user $toUserId sealed=$sealed " +
+                "toDevices=${outgoing.map { it.deviceId }.distinct()}")
+            // 🔴 The OUTCOME, not just the attempt. "POSTing" told us the code
+            // reached the call; it did not tell us whether the request left the
+            // phone. A DNS blip or a dropped connection throws here, and every
+            // caller above treats a thrown send as a failed message without
+            // ever saying what failed.
             try {
                 relay.sendEnvelopes(
                     toUserId, outgoing, identity.deviceId,
+                    silent = !warrantsAlert(text),
                     // ⚠️ The key only when there is no capability. Sending both
                     // would let the relay accept on the key when the capability
                     // had been revoked, so it would never learn it was refused
@@ -651,7 +726,15 @@ class Conversations(
                     deliveryKey = if (peerToken == null) peerKey?.let(Wire::b64) else null,
                     deliveryToken = peerToken,
                 )
-            } catch (e: RelayException.Unauthorized) {
+                System.err.println("fnmsg-send: relay ACCEPTED ${outgoing.size} envelope(s)")
+            } catch (e: Exception) {
+                if (e !is RelayException.Unauthorized) {
+                    System.err.println("fnmsg-send: SEND FAILED " +
+                        "(${e.javaClass.simpleName}: ${e.message}) — the message did " +
+                        "not leave this phone")
+                    throw e
+                }
+                @Suppress("NAME_SHADOWING") val e = e
                 // 🔴 **A refused capability means the batch was revoked.**
                 // Retrying with the rest of it for ever is how a conversation
                 // quietly stops working, so the batch goes and the SAME
@@ -1081,6 +1164,11 @@ class Conversations(
                         openWith(E2ESession.respond(identity, envelope), envelope)
                     } else null
 
+                System.err.println(
+                    "fnmsg-recv: envelope ${message.id} opened by " +
+                        (if (fromCurrent != null) "current" else if (fromRetired != null) "retired"
+                         else if (fromFresh != null) "FRESH handshake" else "nothing") +
+                        " (sealed=$sealed, handshake=${envelope.handshake != null})")
                 val plaintext = when {
                     fromCurrent != null -> {
                         vault.saveSession(fromDevice, fromCurrent.session)
@@ -1170,7 +1258,22 @@ class Conversations(
                                 sealed = sealed, senderProven = senderProven,
                                 at = message.createdAt,
                                 fromAddress = fromAddress)
-            } catch (_: Exception) {
+            } catch (failure: Exception) {
+                // 🔴 **Skipped, but never again in silence.** Swallowing this
+                // whole is what made Android's half of every delivery
+                // investigation unreadable: the relay says delivered, the app
+                // shows nothing, and the one place that knew why threw the
+                // reason away. The message is still skipped — that part was
+                // right — but it now says which envelope, from which device,
+                // and what actually failed.
+                //
+                // ⚠️ The exception type and its message only. Neither carries
+                // plaintext or key material; `IdentityChangedException` carries
+                // a user id and the rest are fixed strings.
+                System.err.println(
+                    "fnmsg-recv: DROPPED envelope ${message.id} from " +
+                        "${message.fromDevice.take(8)} — " +
+                        "${failure.javaClass.simpleName}: ${failure.message}")
                 // Deliberately swallowed and skipped. One undecryptable message
                 // is not a reason to stop reading the inbox.
                 //
@@ -1188,7 +1291,7 @@ class Conversations(
 
     /** How many prekeys we have left with the relay, and a top-up when it is low. */
     fun replenishPreKeysIfLow(threshold: Int = 5, batch: Int = 20): Int {
-        val mine = relay.fetchKeys(myUserId ?: return 0)
+        val mine = relay.fetchKeys(myUserId ?: return 0).bundles
             .firstOrNull { it.deviceId == identity.deviceId } ?: return 0
         // The relay pops one per fetch, so seeing none here means the pool was
         // empty before this call, not that this call drained it.

client/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/client/RelayAuth.kt

@@ -50,17 +50,40 @@ class RelayAuth(
      * A valid token, minting one when the cache is empty or close to expiry.
      * Null when this deployment does not issue them.
      */
+    /** Plain Kotlin module: no android.util.Log here. On device this lands in
+     *  logcat as `W/System.err`, which is what matters — it is READABLE. */
+    private fun warn(message: String) = System.err.println("fnmsg-auth: $message")
+
     fun token(now: Long = System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000): String? {
         if (unavailable) return null
         cached?.let { if (it.expiresAt - SLACK_SECONDS > now) return it.token }
         val minted = try {
             mint(deviceId, Wire.b64(identityKey.publicKey))
-        } catch (_: RelayException.NotFound) {
+        } catch (e: RelayException.NotFound) {
+            // 🔴 **Say it.** Every failure here used to be swallowed in
+            // silence, and the consequence was invisible: with no token the
+            // client falls back to Basic, the relay refuses `/e2e/*` — which it
+            // does by design — and the user sees "the call failed", "could not
+            // finish setting up", or an inbox that 410s and wipes itself. Four
+            // hours of debugging produced symptoms and no cause, because the
+            // one line that knew what went wrong discarded it.
+            warn("no token: relay has no /account/token route; " +
+                "falling back to Basic, which /e2e/* refuses. Calls and device " +
+                "registration will fail until this is fixed." + " [" + e + "]")
             unavailable = true
             return null
-        } catch (_: Exception) {
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            warn("no token: minting failed (${e.javaClass.simpleName}: " +
+                "${e.message}); falling back to Basic, which /e2e/* refuses.")
             return null
-        } ?: return null
+        } ?: run {
+            // ⚠️ A non-2xx that is not 404 arrives here as null, not as a
+            // throw, so this branch is NOT unreachable — it was the quietest
+            // path of the three.
+            warn("no token: /account/token answered a non-success " +
+                "status; falling back to Basic, which /e2e/* refuses.")
+            return null
+        }
         cached = Cached(minted.token, now + minted.lifetimeSeconds)
         return minted.token
     }

client/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/client/RelayClient.kt

@@ -138,10 +138,31 @@ class RelayClient(
      * starting a session. Polling it drains the pool and pushes every peer onto
      * the last-resort key, which costs initial forward secrecy for everyone.
      */
-    fun fetchKeys(userId: Long): List<PeerBundle> {
+    /** A peer's bundles, and the address their key-log entries are filed under. */
+    data class Keys(val fnid: String?, val bundles: List<PeerBundle>)
+
+    /**
+     * 🔴 **The `fnid` is not decoration; without it the key log cannot be
+     * checked.** The relay files a leaf under `fnid:<address>` once an account
+     * has claimed one, and under `local:<audience>/<id>` before that. A
+     * verifier that does not know the address computes the other subject, finds
+     * no matching leaf, and refuses to send — reporting "has published keys,
+     * but none match what this relay served" for a conversation in which
+     * nothing is wrong.
+     *
+     * This response has always carried it and this method always dropped it, so
+     * every newly registered device on an account with an address was
+     * unverifiable and therefore unsendable-to. It presents as messaging
+     * breaking the moment somebody reinstalls.
+     */
+    fun fetchKeys(userId: Long): Keys {
         val body = getJson("/e2e/keys/$userId")
         val devices = body.optJSONArray("devices") ?: JSONArray()
-        return (0 until devices.length()).map { PeerBundle.fromWire(devices.getJSONObject(it)) }
+        return Keys(
+            fnid = body.optString("fnid").ifEmpty { null },
+            bundles = (0 until devices.length())
+                .map { PeerBundle.fromWire(devices.getJSONObject(it)) },
+        )
     }
 
     /** `GET /e2e/devices/{user}` — who a user is, costing no prekey. */
@@ -196,6 +217,19 @@ class RelayClient(
          * revocation is the whole lever §21 adds.
          */
         deliveryToken: String? = null,
+        /**
+         * Deliver without announcing: protocol traffic, not a message.
+         *
+         * 🔴 **The relay announced everything, because it cannot tell.** It
+         * holds ciphertext, so a call answer, a delivery key and a birthday
+         * message are the same bytes to it — and every one of them raised
+         * "New message" on the far end. One call produced a burst of banners
+         * for things nobody sent. The sender is the only party that knows.
+         *
+         * ⚠️ Advisory and unauthenticated. A sender that lies suppresses its
+         * own notifications and nobody else's.
+         */
+        silent: Boolean = false,
     ): JSONObject =
         postJson("/e2e/messages", JSONObject()
             .put("to", toUser)
@@ -203,6 +237,7 @@ class RelayClient(
                 if (deliveryToken != null) body.put("delivery_token", deliveryToken)
                 else if (deliveryKey != null) body.put("delivery_key", deliveryKey)
                 else body.put("from_device", fromDevice)
+                if (silent) body.put("silent", true)
             }
             .put("messages", JSONArray().also { array ->
                 envelopes.forEach {

client/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/client/Trust.kt

@@ -247,6 +247,21 @@ class Trust(
     /** The address this contact was pinned under, if any. */
     fun pinnedFnid(userId: Long): String? = vault.loadTrust(userId)?.fnid
 
+    /**
+     * Record the address the relay served for this contact.
+     *
+     * ⚠️ Not a trust decision — it changes nothing about which identity keys
+     * are accepted. It only records the SUBJECT their key-log leaves are filed
+     * under, which a verifier needs and the device directory does not serve.
+     * Storing it means a later send that establishes no new session can still
+     * check the log.
+     */
+    fun rememberFnid(userId: Long, fnid: String) {
+        val existing = vault.loadTrust(userId) ?: return
+        if (existing.fnid == fnid) return
+        vault.saveTrust(userId, existing.copy(fnid = fnid))
+    }
+
     /** Trust as it stands, for UI that has not triggered a fetch. */
     fun state(userId: Long): IdentityTrust {
         val t = vault.loadTrust(userId) ?: return IdentityTrust.UNKNOWN
@@ -289,8 +304,25 @@ class Trust(
      * the tick in place would show "verified" for something nobody verified.
      */
     fun acceptIdentityChange(userId: Long, handle: String? = null) {
-        val offered = relay.fetchKeys(userId).map { it.identitySigning }
+        // ⚠️ The address is taken from the SAME response that carries the keys.
-        if (offered.isEmpty()) return
+        // Accepting a change and then filing it under a stale address leaves
+        // the key log uncheckable for the very keys just accepted.
+        val served = relay.fetchKeys(userId)
+        val offered = served.bundles.map { it.identitySigning }
+        // 🔴 **An empty answer is a FAILURE, not an acceptance of nothing.**
+        // This returned quietly, so a fetch that was rate-limited, timed out or
+        // 500'd left the pin exactly as it was — while the UI reported the
+        // change accepted. The person taps "accept", nothing happens, every
+        // message stays refused, and the app insists the problem is on the
+        // other end. Observed after a burst of retries tripped the per-contact
+        // key-fetch limit, which is precisely when somebody is trying to
+        // recover a conversation and most needs this to work.
+        if (offered.isEmpty()) {
+            throw RelayException.Malformed(
+                "the server returned no keys for this contact, so there was " +
+                    "nothing to accept — try again in a moment")
+        }
+        served.fnid?.let { rememberFnid(userId, it) }
         // Re-resolve rather than keep the old address: if what changed WAS the
         // address, keeping it would leave every later check recomputing against
         // a name this account no longer publishes under, and honest keys would

client/src/test/kotlin/io/flamenet/client/LiveKeyLogTest.kt

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ class LiveKeyLogTest {
         // was served. Bob genuinely published this key a moment ago, so the
         // relay can prove it — and if this throws, enforcement is refusing
         // honest keys, which is worse than not enforcing at all.
-        val bundle = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).single { it.deviceId == bob.identity.deviceId }
+        val bundle = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).bundles.single { it.deviceId == bob.identity.deviceId }
         val trust = alice.trust()
         trust.enforceKeyLog(bundle, bob.userId)
 
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ class LiveKeyLogTest {
         val alice = Actor(url, "c")
         val bob = Actor(url, "d")
 
-        val real = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).single { it.deviceId == bob.identity.deviceId }
+        val real = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).bundles.single { it.deviceId == bob.identity.deviceId }
         val substituted = io.flamenet.e2e.PeerBundle(
             deviceId = real.deviceId,
             identityDH = real.identityDH,
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ class LiveKeyLogTest {
         val bob = Actor(url, "f")
 
         val trust = alice.trust()
-        val first = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).single { it.deviceId == bob.identity.deviceId }
+        val first = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).bundles.single { it.deviceId == bob.identity.deviceId }
         trust.enforceKeyLog(first, bob.userId)
         val pinned = alice.vault.loadKeyLogPin(alice.relay.host)!!
 
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ class LiveKeyLogTest {
         // second call must produce and verify a real consistency proof from the
         // pinned size to the new one.
         val second = Actor(url, "g")
-        val third = alice.relay.fetchKeys(second.userId)
+        val third = alice.relay.fetchKeys(second.userId).bundles
             .single { it.deviceId == second.identity.deviceId }
         trust.enforceKeyLog(third, second.userId)
 
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ class LiveKeyLogTest {
             relay = alice.relay.host, pin = Vault.KeyLogPin(head.getInt("size"), Wire.b64(ByteArray(32) { 0x5A }))
         )
 
-        val bundle = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).single { it.deviceId == bob.identity.deviceId }
+        val bundle = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).bundles.single { it.deviceId == bob.identity.deviceId }
         assertFailsWith<KeyLogForkException> {
             alice.trust().enforceKeyLog(bundle, bob.userId)
         }
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ class LiveKeyLogTest {
             .also { it.useRelayAuth(second) }
             .registerDevice(second, second.generateOneTimePreKeys(3))
 
-        val bundle = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).single { it.deviceId == second.deviceId }
+        val bundle = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).bundles.single { it.deviceId == second.deviceId }
         val trust = alice.trust()
 
         // 1. Nothing pinned: the honest key is refused, and says why — there
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ class LiveKeyLogTest {
         val bob = Actor(url, "o")
 
         val trust = alice.trust()
-        val bundle = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).single { it.deviceId == bob.identity.deviceId }
+        val bundle = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).bundles.single { it.deviceId == bob.identity.deviceId }
 
         // Pin Bob under an address, with his real keys.
         alice.vault.saveTrust(

client/src/test/kotlin/io/flamenet/client/LiveSealedSenderTest.kt

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ class LiveSealedSenderTest {
         // A submission presenting the OLD key must be refused outright. Sent
         // through the client rather than by hand, so this exercises the same
         // path a real sealed send takes.
-        val bundle = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).first { it.deviceId == bob.identity.deviceId }
+        val bundle = alice.relay.fetchKeys(bob.userId).bundles.first { it.deviceId == bob.identity.deviceId }
         val envelope = io.flamenet.e2e.E2ESession.initiate(alice.identity, bundle).encrypt("stale")
         val blob = SealedSender.seal(
             envelope, alice.userId, alice.identity.deviceId, bundle.deviceId, bundle.identityDH)

client/src/test/kotlin/io/flamenet/client/LiveShapesTest.kt

@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ class LiveShapesTest {
         // Reachable means a stranger can fetch a bundle WITH a one-time prekey.
         // A device published without them can send and can never be started
         // with, which looks identical from the account's own side.
-        val bundles = relay.fetchKeys(account.userId)
+        val bundles = relay.fetchKeys(account.userId).bundles
         val mine = bundles.firstOrNull { it.deviceId == identity.deviceId }
         assertTrue(mine != null, "$base served no bundle for the device just registered")
         assertTrue(mine!!.oneTimePreKey != null, "$base served no one-time prekey")

client/src/test/kotlin/io/flamenet/client/LiveSignUpTest.kt

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ class LiveSignUpTest {
 
         // The device is only really registered if a stranger can fetch a bundle
         // for it — that is what makes this phone reachable.
-        val bundles = client.fetchKeys(account.userId)
+        val bundles = client.fetchKeys(account.userId).bundles
         assertTrue(bundles.any { it.deviceId == identity.deviceId },
             "the relay did not serve a bundle for the device we just registered")
         assertTrue(bundles.first { it.deviceId == identity.deviceId }.oneTimePreKey != null,

client/src/test/kotlin/io/flamenet/client/RelayClientTest.kt

@@ -293,7 +293,11 @@ class RelayClientTest {
             .put("opk", JSONObject().put("id", oneTime.id).put("pub", Wire.b64(oneTime.publicKey)))
         server.enqueue(json("""{"devices":[$wire]}"""))
 
-        val bundles = client().fetchKeys(42)
+        // ⚠️ `fetchKeys` answers with the fnid alongside the bundles now — the
+        // address is what the key log is checked against, and returning only
+        // the bundles threw it away at the one point it is available.
+        val fetched = client().fetchKeys(42)
+        val bundles = fetched.bundles
         assertEquals(1, bundles.size)
         assertEquals(peer.deviceId, bundles[0].deviceId)
         assertEquals(oneTime.id, bundles[0].oneTimePreKeyId)

engine/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/e2e/E2ESession.kt

@@ -173,7 +173,24 @@ class E2ESession private constructor(
                 associatedData = X3DH.associatedData(
                     theirIdentitySigning, identity.identitySigningPublic, pq?.second),
                 pendingHandshake = null,
-                version = if (pq == null) 1 else 2,
+                // 🔴 **Honour what the initiator declared; this could never
+                // return 3.** `initiate` above sets 3 whenever the PQ ratchet
+                // is on, but responding capped at 2 — so a session this device
+                // ANSWERED was labelled v2 while the far side ran it as v3.
+                // Every message then arrived at a v3 peer without the
+                // post-quantum material a v3 step requires, and was refused as
+                // a downgrade (§13.4) — correctly, and for ever. iOS-initiated
+                // conversations were one-way: iOS to Android worked, Android to
+                // iOS was silently dropped on arrival.
+                //
+                // ⚠️ Reads the initiator's version rather than assuming 3
+                // whenever PQ is present: a v2 peer sends a PQ block too, and
+                // answering it in v3 breaks the pairing in the other direction.
+                version = when {
+                    pq == null -> 1
+                    envelope.version >= 3 -> 3
+                    else -> 2
+                },
             )
             return session
         }

engine/src/test/kotlin/io/flamenet/e2e/HybridSessionTest.kt

@@ -98,7 +98,19 @@ class HybridSessionTest {
         val delivered = Envelope.fromPayload(envelope.toPayload())
         val bobSide = E2ESession.respond(bob, delivered)
 
-        assertEquals(2, bobSide.version)
+        // 🔴 **3, and asserting 2 here is what hid a real bug for weeks.**
+        // The initiator is v3 two assertions above; a responder that answers
+        // the same handshake as v2 disagrees with its own peer about which
+        // protocol the session runs. Kotlin-to-Kotlin never noticed, because
+        // both ends drive the ratchet off their own PQ state and ignore the
+        // label — so this test round-tripped happily while encoding the defect.
+        //
+        // A v3 peer that does enforce it does notice: iOS refuses a ratchet
+        // step with no post-quantum material as a downgrade, so every message
+        // Android sent into an iOS-initiated session was dropped on arrival and
+        // the conversation ran one way only.
+        assertEquals(3, bobSide.version,
+                     "answering a v3 handshake makes a v3 session, not a v2 one")
         assertEquals("post-quantum hello", bobSide.decrypt(delivered))
         assertContentEquals(session.associatedData, bobSide.associatedData,
                             "both sides must bind the same ciphertext digest")

interop/src/main/kotlin/io/flamenet/interop/Main.kt

@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ private fun handle(req: JSONObject): JSONObject = when (req.getString("cmd")) {
     "encrypt" -> encrypt(req)
     "decrypt" -> decrypt(req)
     // --- the session layer, which is what an app actually uses ------------
-    "session_device" -> sessionDevice()
+    "session_device" -> sessionDevice(req)
     "session_initiate" -> sessionInitiate(req)
     "session_respond" -> sessionRespond(req)
     "session_encrypt" -> sessionEncrypt(req)
@@ -149,6 +149,14 @@ private fun newDevice(req: JSONObject): JSONObject {
     // v3, the legacy paths would stop being covered on the day v3 landed —
     // which is the day they matter most.
     val postQuantum = req.optBoolean("pq", true)
+    // 🔴 **A peer can be asked to advertise an OLDER version, and it has to be
+    // possible to ask.** The standing rule is that the current version and the
+    // one before it interoperate — so when v4 lands, v3 and v4 must talk, and
+    // the only way to keep that honest is a harness that can stand up a peer
+    // on the previous version and hold a real conversation with it. Without
+    // this the suite can only ever test the newest code against itself, which
+    // is the shape of every compatibility bug that has ever shipped.
+    val proto = req.optInt("proto", if (postQuantum) 3 else 1)
     val id = next("kotlin-device-")
     val device = Device(
         deviceId = id,
@@ -183,9 +191,13 @@ private fun newDevice(req: JSONObject): JSONObject {
         // Without `caps_sig` the web engine's `bundleFromWire` discards the
         // whole v2 block and `negotiate` returns v1, which is exactly what this
         // harness was quietly doing before.
+        // ⚠️ Signed over the version actually claimed. A signature over a
+        // different number is exactly what `provenVersion` exists to reject,
+        // and a harness that got this wrong would "prove" compatibility by
+        // silently falling back to v1 on every run.
         .putOpt("caps_sig", if (postQuantum) b64(Ed25519.sign(
-            device.ikSig, CAPS_DOMAIN + byteArrayOf(3.toByte()))) else null)
+            device.ikSig, CAPS_DOMAIN + byteArrayOf(proto.toByte()))) else null)
-        .put("proto", if (postQuantum) 3 else 1)
+        .put("proto", proto)
 
     return JSONObject().put("device", id).put("bundle", bundle)
 }
@@ -338,12 +350,29 @@ private val identities = HashMap<String, DeviceIdentity>()
 private val liveSessions = HashMap<String, E2ESession>()
 
 /** A device and the bundle wire a relay would serve for it, one prekey included. */
-private fun sessionDevice(): JSONObject {
+private fun sessionDevice(req: JSONObject): JSONObject {
     val identity = DeviceIdentity.create()
     identities[identity.deviceId] = identity
     val oneTime = identity.generateOneTimePreKeys(1).first()
     val wire = identity.registrationWire()
         .put("opk", JSONObject().put("id", oneTime.id).put("pub", b64(oneTime.publicKey)))
+    // 🔴 **Stand up a peer on an OLDER version, for the compatibility rule.**
+    // The engine publishes whatever it currently implements, which is right for
+    // a device and useless for testing the release before it — and the standing
+    // rule is that the current version and the one before it interoperate.
+    //
+    // ⚠️ The capability signature is REMADE over the number actually claimed.
+    // Leaving the original in place would advertise one version and sign
+    // another, which `provenVersion` rejects by falling back to v1 — so the
+    // test would quietly pass while exercising a pairing nobody ships.
+    // Overriding lives here rather than in `registrationWire` on purpose: the
+    // engine should publish what it implements, not what a test wants.
+    if (req.has("proto")) {
+        val proto = req.getInt("proto")
+        wire.put("proto", proto)
+        wire.put("caps_sig", b64(Ed25519.sign(
+            identity.identitySigning, CAPS_DOMAIN + byteArrayOf(proto.toByte()))))
+    }
     return JSONObject().put("device", identity.deviceId).put("bundle", wire)
 }
 
@@ -359,6 +388,7 @@ private fun sessionInitiate(req: JSONObject): JSONObject {
         // layer where the one bug this protocol has actually shipped lives: a
         // client and a relay disagreeing about a field name, caught by nothing
         // until a live round trip.
+        .put("version", session.version)
         .put("envelope", session.encrypt(req.getString("text")).toJson())
 }
 
@@ -371,6 +401,12 @@ private fun sessionRespond(req: JSONObject): JSONObject {
     return JSONObject()
         .put("session", id)
         .put("ad", b64(session.associatedData))
+        // 🔴 **What the session ANSWERED with, not what the harness assumes.**
+        // Without this the interop test could not see the version a responder
+        // settled on, and a responder that capped itself below the initiator
+        // shipped: iOS ran the session as v3, this side as v2, and every
+        // message sent into it was refused by the peer as a downgrade.
+        .put("version", session.version)
         .put("text", session.decrypt(envelope))
 }
 
@@ -407,9 +443,12 @@ private fun openSealed(req: JSONObject): JSONObject {
         .put("envelope", opened.envelope.toJson())
 }
 
-private fun sessionEncrypt(req: JSONObject): JSONObject = JSONObject()
+private fun sessionEncrypt(req: JSONObject): JSONObject =
-    .put("envelope", liveSessions.getValue(req.getString("session"))
+    liveSessions.getValue(req.getString("session")).let { session ->
-        .encrypt(req.getString("text")).toJson())
+        JSONObject()
+            .put("version", session.version)
+            .put("envelope", session.encrypt(req.getString("text")).toJson())
+    }
 
 private fun sessionDecrypt(req: JSONObject): JSONObject = JSONObject()
     .put("text", liveSessions.getValue(req.getString("session"))
@@ -426,8 +465,19 @@ private fun sessionDecrypt(req: JSONObject): JSONObject = JSONObject()
 private fun sessionReload(req: JSONObject): JSONObject {
     val id = req.getString("session")
     val archived = liveSessions.getValue(id).archive()
-    liveSessions[id] = E2ESession.fromArchive(JSONObject(archived.toString()))
+    // 🔴 **`as_version` exists to reproduce a phone that stored a session
-    return JSONObject().put("reloaded", true).put("bytes", archived.toString().length)
+    // BEFORE the responder fix, and it is the only way to test the upgrade.**
+    // The version is persisted, so a session written by the old build restores
+    // as v2 no matter how new the code reading it is — updating the app does
+    // NOT repair a conversation already on disk. That population is every
+    // existing user, and nothing else in this harness can produce them.
+    val forced = JSONObject(archived.toString())
+    if (req.has("as_version")) forced.put("version", req.getInt("as_version"))
+    liveSessions[id] = E2ESession.fromArchive(forced)
+    return JSONObject()
+        .put("reloaded", true)
+        .put("version", liveSessions.getValue(id).version)
+        .put("bytes", archived.toString().length)
 }
 
 private fun accountKdf(req: JSONObject): JSONObject {