Second pass with the avoid-ai-writing detector

The skill's detector scored the README, PARITY.md and the extracted
comment prose. Fixed what it flagged: hollow intensifiers, "in order
to", "additionally", "the whole point", bold sentences in docs, and
bold that had wrapped across comment lines. Comment prose scores a
maximum of 4 out of 100 across the repo.

One sweep rule mangled four comments ("which is the entire point of X"
lost its clause); repaired, and the rule now keeps the clause.

Comments and strings only. 1208 tests pass, counted from the XML.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Paul Hitt
2026-09-08 19:20:07 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5.1
parent 4dd544083c
commit 8a7f40fb13
131 changed files with 521 additions and 525 deletions
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ import kotlin.test.assertTrue
/**
* The security lattice, and the two Bell–LaPadula rules it exists to enforce.
*
* **The encoding vectors were computed independently, not read off this
* implementation.** The ten bytes are authenticated data for every construction
* The encoding vectors were computed independently, not read off this
* implementation. The ten bytes are authenticated data for every construction
* that uses a label, so an encoding that differs between platforms does not warn
* it produces a decryption failure, or plaintext that quietly belongs to the
* wrong sensitivity. A vector taken from the code under test would pin whatever
@@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ class LabelTest {
// ---- Writing ---------------------------------------------------------
/**
* **Writing is gated by the same range check as reading, and the
* -property is NOT enforced, on either platform.**
* Writing is gated by the same range check as reading, and the
* -property is NOT enforced, on either platform.
*
* Bell–LaPadula says somebody cleared to read sensitive material must not
* write *below* their clearance, because they would carry what they read