Count the sealed-to-unsealed fallback, and offer to refuse it

Android half of ios#16. `Sent.sealed` already reported each send's outcome, but nothing accumulated, so nobody could answer "how often does this happen to me". 🔴 The copy distinguishes sender from content, with tests asserting it. An unsealed send is still end-to-end encrypted; what the relay learns is who sent it. Somebody who reads "sealed" as "encrypted" makes the wrong decision in both directions. ⚠️ Aggregate only. Per-contact counts would be more useful and would also build a record of who this account talks to and how often — the precise thing sealing exists to keep off a server. Refusing is offered and off by default: it turns a metadata leak into an undelivered message, which for most people is the worse outcome. It has its own exception type so the refusal can explain itself. ⚠️ Refusing spends nothing. `sealed` is false exactly when neither a capability nor a key was found, so `takePeerToken` returned null and there is no token to hand back — my first cut had a line handing one back, which was unreachable. ⚠️ The policy and the counter are injected as lambdas, since `client` and the engine have no Android dependency, and both are wired in one helper. Two sign-in paths build a session, and only one of them applying the policy is how a setting silently stops working on half the app. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 17:57:00 -04:00
parent 1316996ac5
commit 4c3f30e180
9 changed files with 284 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+package io.flamenet.e2e
+
+import kotlin.test.Test
+import kotlin.test.assertEquals
+import kotlin.test.assertFalse
+import kotlin.test.assertNull
+import kotlin.test.assertTrue
+
+/** Counting the sealed-to-unsealed fallback (§14.5, ios#16). */
+class SealingRecordTest {
+
+    @Test
+    fun `a sealed send is counted`() {
+        val r = SealingRecord().recording(wasSealed = true, at = 5)
+        assertEquals(1, r.sealed)
+        assertEquals(0, r.unsealed)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `an unsealed send is counted and stamped`() {
+        val r = SealingRecord().recording(wasSealed = false, at = 1_700_000_000)
+        assertEquals(1, r.unsealed)
+        assertEquals(1_700_000_000, r.lastUnsealedAt)
+    }
+
+    /** ⚠️ One good send afterwards does not unhappen the last bad one. */
+    @Test
+    fun `a sealed send does not clear the last unsealed stamp`() {
+        val r = SealingRecord()
+            .recording(wasSealed = false, at = 100)
+            .recording(wasSealed = true, at = 200)
+        assertEquals(100, r.lastUnsealedAt)
+    }
+
+    /** 🔴 Zero sends is no data, not zero leakage. */
+    @Test
+    fun `no sends has no share rather than zero`() {
+        assertNull(SealingRecord().unsealedShare)
+        assertTrue(SealingRecord().summary.contains("Nothing sent"))
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `the share is what went unsealed`() {
+        var r = SealingRecord()
+        repeat(3) { r = r.recording(wasSealed = true, at = 1) }
+        r = r.recording(wasSealed = false, at = 1)
+        assertEquals(0.25, r.unsealedShare!!, 0.0001)
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * 🔴 **Must not say the message was readable.** An unsealed send is still
+     * end-to-end encrypted; the relay learns the sender, not the content.
+     */
+    @Test
+    fun `the summary distinguishes sender from content`() {
+        val summary = SealingRecord().recording(wasSealed = false, at = 1).summary
+        assertTrue(summary.contains("end-to-end encrypted"), summary)
+        assertTrue(summary.contains("who sent them"), summary)
+        assertTrue(summary.contains("not what they said"), summary)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `a clean record says so without overclaiming`() {
+        var r = SealingRecord()
+        repeat(5) { r = r.recording(wasSealed = true, at = 1) }
+        assertTrue(r.summary.contains("were sealed"), r.summary)
+        assertFalse(r.summary.contains("%"), r.summary)
+    }
+}