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Files
Paul HittandClaude Opus 5 7abe9c0ab2 Remove Flamenet Files, and delete accounts outright
Files was folded into the messenger, so this repository is the account
service and nothing else. The file server, its web client, its tenant
schemas and the documentation for all of it are gone.

Removed: EnclaveServer and its routes, EnclaveAccess, EnclaveCrypto, the
browser client under client/, the Files spec and vectors, the tenant SQL
under sql/, the web build and the node CI job, and the Leaf dependency
that only ever rendered the file server's pages. The Dockerfile built
EnclaveServer and shipped Public/ and Resources/; it now builds the
account service alone.

Nothing was lost. Every table in the production Files database was empty
when this was written: no nodes, no blobs, no identities, no tenants.
flamenetfiles.com, www.flamenetfiles.com and files.flamenet.io were
served by that stack and now answer 404; the compose file, the env and a
schema dump are on the box under /srv/prod/backups/, and the two docker
volumes were kept rather than pruned.

The service now issues pseudonyms for one product. `050_retire_files.sql`
deletes the `files` rows and replaces the CHECK constraint rather than
dropping it, so a container still being drained cannot write one back.
Every account had a `files` pseudonym and none had a `files` identity,
which is why there is no key material to migrate: the row was bookkeeping
for a product nobody enrolled in.

That also settles the delete endpoint added on this branch. It was built
around keeping a shared account alive while another product still held an
identity, and with one product that rule can never fire. `AccountRemoval`
and its five tests are gone, the response no longer reports which of two
outcomes happened, and a delete simply removes the account. None of it
had shipped, so there is no wire compatibility to keep.

Verified: the suites pass, the live delete script passes against a real
Postgres and a running service, and the image builds and boots to its
"DATABASE_URL is required" refusal, which is the account service and not
a file server.

`flamenet/files/auth/v1` stays as the authentication context string. It
is a wire constant baked into every stored verifier, not a product name,
and changing it would lock out every existing account. Said so in
ARCHITECTURE.md so nobody tidies it later.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 17:30:55 -04:00

3.0 KiB

Self-hosting the Flamenet account service

You probably do not need this.

A relay keeps its own accounts by default, and that is not a lesser mode: people register, message, exchange keys and verify the transparency log exactly as they would anywhere else. This service exists for one thing, a Flamenet credential that works across more than one relay, and running it only makes sense if you run more than one.

If you are hosting a relay, read docs/HOSTING.md in the relay repository first. It explains the three shapes and which one you want.

What it needs

Postgres, and two secrets of at least 32 characters each.

cp .env.example .env
docker compose up -d
Variable
POSTGRES_PASSWORD required
ENCLAVE_JWT_SECRET required, 32+ characters. Signs session tokens.
ENCLAVE_ACCOUNTS_SECRET required, 32+ characters. Derives pseudonyms and the decoy salts that stop handle enumeration.
ENCLAVE_ACCOUNTS_DB_PASSWORD the login for the service's own restricted role
ENCLAVE_ACCOUNTS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS only if a browser calls this service. The apps are not browsers.
ENCLAVE_BIND defaults to 127.0.0.1. Leave it there and put a reverse proxy in front.
ENCLAVE_ACCOUNTS_PORT defaults to 8100

docker-compose.yml runs the migrations in their own one-shot service before the server starts, so a half-migrated database never serves traffic.

⛔ The two secrets you cannot change later

ENCLAVE_ACCOUNTS_SECRET derives every account's per-product pseudonym. Change it and every existing account becomes a different person to every relay that trusts you, orphaning their data with no way back. Set it once, back it up, and treat losing it as losing the deployment.

ENCLAVE_JWT_SECRET has to match whatever verifies the tokens. A mismatch looks like every session being rejected for no visible reason.

Prefer the asymmetric path: set ENCLAVE_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY to an Ed25519 seed and relays verify through /.well-known/jwks.json instead. That is the difference between a federation somebody else can join and one they cannot, because the shared secret that checks a token is also the secret that mints one.

Backups

One database, enclave-pgdata. There is no blob store and no per-tenant schema; the whole service is a handful of small tables. pg_dump it.

A backup you have never restored is a belief, not a backup.

Upgrades

Migrations run automatically from the accounts-migrate service on each docker compose up. They are append-only: Fluent records what it has run and never runs it twice, so editing an applied migration works on a fresh database and silently does nothing on yours.

The one that bit us

Production connects as accounts_service, a role whose search_path the schema sets to enclave_accounts. Every table name in the models is unqualified and relies on it. Connect as any other role and every query fails with relation "accounts" does not exist, which reads like a broken migration and is not.