Archived
Its own binary, container and database role, granted nothing outside enclave_accounts. It cannot read a file row and a tenant role cannot read an account; the signed token is the entire interface between them. One passphrase yields two unrelated secrets: an authentication secret under flamenet/<product>/auth/v1 that reaches the service, and an encryption key under flamenet/<product>/identity/v1 that never leaves the browser. A fully compromised account service can impersonate a user to itself and decrypt nothing. Each product server sees only HMAC(service_secret, account_id || product), so Files cannot correlate its users with Messenger's. Unknown handles return a deterministic fake stretch salt, so the endpoint cannot enumerate accounts. No email is stored. Clearance is granted by CLI, never by an endpoint. The recovery code now covers both halves — restoring file access while leaving the account credential stale would have locked the user out either way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
8 lines
62 B
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8 lines
62 B
Plaintext
.build/
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.env
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*.xcodeproj
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blobs/
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docs/
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Public/js/crypto/
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