This one looked like it already worked. The path returned HTTP 200, so an estate-wide check that only reads status codes counts it as present. What it returned was the SPA shell: the catch-all answers any non-/api path with index.html, so the file a researcher or a scanner looks for was a page of HTML. A 404 would have been more honest. SECURITY.md was no better. It told a reporter to "email the project maintainers at the address on the GitLab project page", which is not an address. It now names security@caelum.network, which was created as an alias and confirmed to answer 250 in an SMTP conversation from off the mail server. The route is registered before the SPA block so the catch-all cannot swallow it, and Expires is computed per request: RFC 9116 makes it mandatory and tells consumers to disregard a file that has passed it, so a hardcoded date is a promise to come back and edit it in a year. Policy points at SECURITY.md, which is publicly readable. Verified on a real request: 200, text/plain; charset=utf-8. The production container sets no PUBLIC_BASE_URL, so the canonical falls back to https://caelum.network, which is correct. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.1 KiB
2.1 KiB
Security Policy
Supported versions
Caelum is pre-1.0. Only the main branch receives security fixes.
Reporting a vulnerability
Do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability.
Email security@caelum.network, which is also published at
/.well-known/security.txt.
Include:
- A description of the issue.
- Steps to reproduce, or a proof-of-concept if you have one.
- The commit SHA or release version where you observed the behaviour.
- Whether you'd like to be credited in the fix announcement.
You will receive an acknowledgement within 72 hours. We aim to release a fix within 30 days for high-severity issues and 90 days for everything else. We will coordinate disclosure with you so the fix lands before the issue is published.
Scope
The following are in scope:
- Authentication and authorisation in the API server.
- Server-side request validation, SQL injection, command injection, path traversal.
- Cross-site scripting in the SPA.
- Improper secret handling in code or in the deploy bundle.
- Vulnerabilities in the Nox runtime that could break out of the interpreter's sandbox.
The following are typically out of scope:
- Issues that require physical access to a user's machine.
- Issues in a third-party dependency without a clear path to exploit Caelum.
- Denial-of-service via volumetric attacks against your own deployment.
- Social engineering of project maintainers.
Hardening notes for self-hosters
- Set
JWT_SECRETto a long random string. The seed value in the deploy template is intentionally invalid. - Use TLS in front of the Node process. The server binds plain HTTP.
- Restrict the MySQL user's grants to only the two databases the application uses.
- Keep your Node, npm, and OS packages up to date.
- The Nox runtime in
realmode connects to telescope and dome hardware. Treat the/api/nox/runendpoint as authenticated and rate-limited at your reverse proxy.
Credits
Security researchers who report valid issues are credited in the fix's commit and release notes unless they prefer to remain anonymous.